Title Registration for a Systematic Review: Third Party Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: A Systematic Review
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Submitted to the Coordinating Group of:

- [x] Crime and Justice
- [ ] Education
- [ ] Disability
- [ ] International Development
- [ ] Nutrition
- [ ] Social Welfare
- [ ] Other:

Plans to co-register:

- [x] No
- [ ] Yes
- [ ] Cochrane
- [ ] Other
- [ ] Maybe

Date Submitted: 2 August 2013
Date Revision Submitted:
Approval Date:
Publication Date: 2 September 2013

Note: Campbell Collaboration Systematic Review Title Registration Template version date: 24 February 2013
A substantial body of criminological literature demonstrates that crime and disorder clusters at specific places (e.g., Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2010; Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989), amongst particular types of people (e.g., Bergman & Andershed, 2009; Jennings & Reingle, 2012; Moffit, 1993, 2003; Nagin, Farrington, & Moffit, 1995), and at particular times of the day, week, month and year (see Bowers and colleagues, 1998, 2004; Farrell & Pease, 1994; Johnson et al., 2007; Ratcliffe and colleagues, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2008; Townsley, 2008; Uittenbogaard & Ceccato, 2012; Wells, Wu, & Ye, 2012). Research shows that policing interventions that target criminogenic places, people and times are effective for controlling crime and disorder problems. For example, we know that directed police patrols controls crime and disorder at hotspots (see Braga et al., 2012 for a review); mandatory arrest reduces recidivism for some domestic violence offenders (Ariel & Sherman, 2012; Maxwell, Garner, & Fagan, 2002); and crackdowns followed by target hardening interrupts the temporal clustering of repeat burglary victimisation (e.g., Forrester Chatterton, & Pease, 1988; Farrell et al., 1998).

Third Party Policing (TPP) is an approach that has expanded the capacity of police to target geographical, temporal and individual factors that underlie crime and disorder. When using TPP, police partner with external entities (‘third parties’) – such as, housing authorities, licensing authorities, business owners – in order to harness their legal powers to regulate the underlying social, physical and/or economic conditions that generate crime and disorder problems (Buerger & Mazerolle, 1994, 1998; Green Mazerolle & Roehl, 1998; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). For example, Eck and Wartell (1998) illustrate how nuisance abatement legislation can be used to modify conditions thought to be generating drug-related crime and disorder at particular addresses. Generally, this type of legislation requires property owners to abate designated ‘nuisance’ offences at their properties and provides regulatory bodies with the legal power to impose sanctions against property owners should the problem persist. In Eck and Wartell’s experiment, police partnered with San Deigo’s Code Compliance Department (third party) to work with property owners to address drug-related problems at the identified properties (e.g., evicting offending tenants). If police found persistent drug activity, nuisance abatement legislation provided the compliance department with the legal power to fine property owners or close their properties for up to one year.

The trend towards partnership approaches, like TPP, has emerged out of global transformations in governance and regulation (see Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005 for review). These transformations have led to a proliferation of regulatory agencies and laws (Braithwaite, 1999, 2000) and a blurring of boundaries between traditional categories of law (Cheh, 1998; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). As a result, policing now emphasises the use of
partnerships with external crime control ‘nodes’ or entities that sit within broader regulatory networks (Crawford et al., 2005, 2006, 2009; Ericson, 2007; Jones & Newburn, 2006; Loader, 2000). Through these partnerships, police are provided with a broad range of new opportunities and strategies to control and prevent crime.

TPP is identified as one of eight key policing innovations (Weisburd & Braga, 2006) that is part of “a new crime control establishment” (Garland, 2001, p. 17) increasingly drawn upon by police in times of fiscal restraint (see Ayling, Grabosky, & Shearing, 2009). Mazerolle and Ransley (2005) demonstrate that TPP is possibly quite effective for reducing a wide-range of crime and disorder problems. However, TPP is not without controversy. Some scholars note potential negative side effects of TPP and question the ethical nature of the approach (see, for example, Desmond & Valdez, 2012; Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005; Meares, 2006).

Therefore, we propose a systematic review of the empirical TPP literature to examine the impact of TPP on crime and disorder.

**OBJECTIVES**

The primary objective of this review is to systematically evaluate the impact of TPP interventions on crime and/or disorder. We will achieve this by synthesising the results of published and unpublished empirical research on TPP interventions and by addressing the following research questions:

1. What impact does TPP have on crime and/or disorder?
2. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of TPP partnership?
3. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of legal lever or third party utilised?
4. Does the impact of TPP vary by the type of crime or disorder targeted?
5. Does the impact of TPP vary by the target of the TPP intervention (e.g., offenders versus crime places)?

**EXISTING REVIEWS**

In 2005, Mazerolle and Ransley conducted a systematic search for empirical TPP literature. The authors examined effect sizes and provided a qualitative review of eligible research, but did not perform a meta-analysis. We propose an updated systematic search and the first systematic review of TPP that (a) is theoretically and methodologically refined, and (b) includes a meta-analysis.

**INTERVENTION**

A TPP intervention occurs when police work in partnership with one or more external third parties to control or prevent crime problem(s), through the use of legal levers available to the third party (Figure 1). There are four key components in this definition that are critical for
understanding TPP in practice: (1) third party, (2) legal lever, (3) crime or disorder problem, and (4) the nature of the partnership.

(1) A ‘third party’ is an entity operating within a legal framework that provides the third party with legal powers not directly available to police. A third party can be an individual (e.g., property owner), an organisation (e.g., Pharmacy Guild), a business (e.g., a bar), regulatory authorities (e.g., liquor licensing authority, local council, school), government departments (e.g., education department), or a network of collaborating agencies (e.g., see Green, 1996).

(2) The legal powers possessed by third parties, referred to as ‘legal levers’, create a crime control or crime prevention capacity that police seek to harness in TPP interventions. Example legal levers include: conduct licensing (e.g., alcohol, firearms), mandatory reporting (e.g., chemical sales, child abuse), orders to control behaviour (e.g., gang or domestic violence injunctions, truancy regulations), orders under regulatory codes (e.g., building, fire, health and safety, noise codes), and property controls (e.g., drug nuisance abatement).

![Figure 1. Third Party Policing Model](image)

(3) The term ‘crime problem’ within TPP reflects the idea that there are multiple criminogenic components underlying crime events. TPP interventions aim to modify one underlying component of a crime problem (e.g., actual offenders), or multiple components (e.g., actual crime place or place managers) through a third party’s legal levers.

(4) The final feature of TPP is the active role police play in establishing a partnership with third parties in order to harness their crime control or prevention capacity. TPP partnerships can be described according to the TPP Partnership Matrix (Figure 2), where TPP partnerships are categorised along two continuums: number of third parties and type of engagement. TPP partnerships can involve single or multiple third parties and techniques to engage third parties range from collaborative to coercive on the ‘Engagement Continuum’.
Figure 2. Third Party Policing Partnership Matrix

POPULATION

As we are interested in the impact of TPP on crime and/or disorder in general the population will include people or places. Therefore, we will code and analyse all empirical literature that (a) satisfies TPP intervention criteria (see previous section); (b) where the unit of analysis is people or places; (c) reports on a crime and/or disorder outcome (see section below); and (d) falls within the range of study designs we will consider for the review (see section below).

OUTCOMES

Crime and disorder is the primary outcome of interest for this review. Because of the variation in measurement across criminological literature (see Addington, 2009) the scope of crime and disorder outcomes considered for the review will be relatively wide. We will code and analyse:

- All categories of crime (e.g., property, violent, drug offences) at all levels of analysis (e.g., individuals, places)
- All categories of crime (e.g., property, violent, drug offences)
- Official measures of crime (e.g., arrest data, crime rates, calls-for-service data)
- Unofficial measures of crime (e.g., citizen reported crime)
- Systematic observations of social disorder (e.g., public intoxication, loitering, solicitation, excess noise)
- Systematic observations of physical disorder (e.g., dilapidated or abandoned properties, rubbish, graffiti)

STUDY DESIGNS

Our review will consider quantitative research utilising experimental, quasi-experimental or interrupted time-series evaluation designs. Evaluations must include a valid comparison
group that does not receive the intervention. Eligible designs include: randomised controlled trials, natural experiments, non-equivalent control group designs, time-series designs, regression point displacement designs, and regression-discontinuity designs. To be included in the meta-analysis, evaluations must have also reported an effect-size, or sufficient detail to allow an effect size to be calculated.

Our preliminary examination of the literature found several examples of methodologically robust evaluations of TPP interventions that are eligible for inclusion in this review. For example, Eck and Wartell (1998, see above) evaluated the DART intervention using a randomised controlled trial design whereby residential properties were randomly assigned to a control group \( n = 42 \) or one of two treatment groups \( n = 42 \) and \( n = 37 \). The main outcome measure used by Eck and Wartell was 30 months of post-intervention official crime which was aggregated into five six-month intervals for each site. Similarly, Mazerolle and colleagues (1998, 2000) evaluated Oakland’s Beat Health Program (California) by randomly allocating street blocks to either the control business-as-usual condition \( n = 50 \) or experimental Beat Health program condition \( n = 50 \). In Mazerolle et al. (1998), site-level systematic observations of physical and systematic disorder at the time of allocation and 5-months later were used as the outcome measure, whilst Mazerolle et al. (2000) used street-level calls-for-service data over a 39-month period (22 months pre- and 12-months post-intervention) as the outcome measure. Weisburd and Green (1995) evaluated the Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Program that included TPP strategies, also using a randomised controlled trial design. Using a randomised block design, hotspots were categorised into four groups depending their level of calls-for-service and arrest activity and then randomly allocated, within these groups, to either the control condition (business-as-usual, \( n = 28 \)) or the experimental condition \( n = 28 \). Calls-for-service data at each hotspot for the periods seven months before and seven months after the intervention was used the outcome measure. Other authors have also evaluated TPP strategies using quasi-experimental techniques (e.g., see Baker & Wolfer, 2003; Higgins & Couldren, 2000). Therefore, we expect that our systematic search will identify a sufficient number of eligible studies for inclusion in the review.

We anticipate that some TPP research will utilise time-series designs without a valid comparison group (see Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005). Whilst acknowledging the lower methodological quality of these studies, we will include time-series evaluations without a comparison group. To address potential bias, we will perform a subgroup analysis using research design as a predictor variable.
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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Content: Mazerolle, Higginson, Eggins
• Systematic review methods: Higginson, Eggins
• Statistical analysis: Higginson
• Information retrieval: Eggins

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Professor Mazerolle is one of the founding TPP scholars, has evaluated a number of policing interventions with TPP components, and has published widely on TPP and related topics. Nevertheless, Professor Mazerolle is neither advocate nor critic of TPP, for example, chapter seven of her TPP book clearly articulates equity issues and potentially negative side effects of TPP. Professor Mazerolle is committed to generating a neutral and accurate review of the impact of TPP in order to make a meaningful contribution to crime control/prevention policy and practice; irrespective of whether the review’s findings contradict her previous research endeavours.

FUNDING

Internal funding. In-kind support for this review will be provided by the Institute for Social Science Research (ISSR) at the University of Queensland, Australia.

External funding. Support for this review will also be provided by an Australian Research Council (ARC) Laureate Fellowship awarded to Professor Mazerolle in June 2010 (Multi-Site Trials of Third Party Policing: Building the Scientific Capacity for Experimental Criminology and Evidence-Based Social Policy in Australia, Grant Number: FL100100014).

PRELIMINARY TIMEFRAME

• Date you plan to submit a draft protocol: 19 July 2013
• Date you plan to submit a draft review: 7 February 2014

DECLARATION

Authors’ responsibilities

By completing this form, you accept responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and updating the review in accordance with Campbell Collaboration policy. The Coordinating Group will provide as much support as possible to assist with the preparation of the review.

A draft protocol must be submitted to the Coordinating Group within one year of title acceptance. If drafts are not submitted before the agreed deadlines, or if we are unable to contact you for an extended period, the Coordinating Group has the right to de-register the title or transfer the title to alternative authors. The Coordinating Group also has the right to
de-register or transfer the title if it does not meet the standards of the Coordinating Group and/or the Campbell Collaboration.

You accept responsibility for maintaining the review in light of new evidence, comments and criticisms, and other developments, and updating the review every five years, when substantial new evidence becomes available, or, if requested, transferring responsibility for maintaining the review to others as agreed with the Coordinating Group.

**Publication in the Campbell Library**

The support of the Coordinating Group in preparing your review is conditional upon your agreement to publish the protocol, finished review and subsequent updates in the Campbell Library. Concurrent publication in other journals is encouraged. However, a Campbell systematic review should be published either before, or at the same time as, its publication in other journals. Authors should not publish Campbell reviews in journals before they are ready for publication in the Campbell Library. Authors should remember to include a statement mentioning the published Campbell review in any non-Campbell publications of the review.

I understand the commitment required to undertake a Campbell review, and agree to publish in the Campbell Library. Signed on behalf of the authors:

Form completed by: Lorraine Mazerolle  
Date: 2 August 2013

**REFERENCES**


