Supplement

Unemployment Benefit Exhaustion: Incentive Effects on Job Finding Rates

Trine Filges, Lars Pico Geerdsen, Anne-Sofie Due Knudsen,
Anne-Marie Klint Jørgensen, & Krystyna Kowalski

Contents

1. DATA EXTRACTION

1.1. Descriptive data for studies with effect estimate

Author	Korpi	van Ours, Vodopivec	Portugal, Addison
Year	1995	2006	2008
Country	Sweden	Slovenia	Portugal
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Economica	Journal of Labor Economics	Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Time period covered by data	1981-1985	August 1, 1997- December 31, 1999	1992(2)-1997(4)
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Questionnaire
Type of unemployment scheme	UI and UA	UI	UI
Target group	Persons between 16 and 24 who were registered as unemployed at employment agencies in the County of Stockholm in the beginning of 1981. (p. 156)	NA	16-64 years of age, men only (p.398)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Persons between 16 and 24 who were registered as unemployed at employment agencies in the County of Stockholm in the beginning of 1981. (p. 156)	Has to register with an unemployment office and depends on work history (p. 355)	Under the Portuguese law, individuals have to have been employed for at least 18 months during the 2 years before the unemployment event to draw UI benefits proper. (p. 396)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	Earnings related (p. 354)	65% of the previous wage (p. 397)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	UA - means-tested (p. 355)	Between 70% and 100% of the minimum wage (p. 397)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	Yes - public labour market training programmes and public relief jobs. (p. 355)	Not compulsory, but unemployed has the opportunity to participate in ALMP activities. (p. 355)	NA

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Seven (UA) and 14 (UI) months (p. 355)	Before the reform: 3 months with 0-1.5 years of experience, 6 months with 1.5-5, 9 months with 5-10 years, 12 months with 10-15 years and 18 months with 15-20 years of work experience. After the reform: 3months with 0-5, 6 months with 5-15 and 9 months with 15-20 (p. 361)	10 months if <25 years, 12 months for those aged between 25 and 29 years, it then increases in 3-month intervals for each incremental 5 years of age, up to a maximum of 30 months at age 55. (p. 397)
Destination	Permanent, temporary jobs, labour market programs	The study distinguishes between job finding and other exit destinations. (p. 358)	Open-ended employment, fixed-term contract, part time, self-employment, public employment, inactivity (table 5 p. 411)
Sampling frequency	Participants were interviewed four times: spring 1981, autumn 1981, spring 1982 and 1985 (p.356) OR 'labour market history' was collected every week between 1981 to 1982 and then monthly untill 1985 (p.356)	Daily	Weekly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly	Monthly	Weekly
Sample size	830 individuals (p. 356)	9,196 males, 10,853 females (p. 358)	9451 individuals (p. 398)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	Since 1995, its unemployment rate has remained remarkably stable, at a level of 6% - 7%. (p. 354)	Yes - over the sample period, Portuguese unemployment rose by almost two-thirds - from 4.1% to 6.7% (p. 403)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	Yes (p. 374)	Yes (p. 401)
Censoring level	NA	NA	Approx. 80 %
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 371)	Yes (p. 401)

Author	Adamchik	Jenkins, García-Serrano	Card, Chetty, Weber
Year	1999	2004	2007
Country	Poland	Spain	Austria
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics	Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics	AEA papers and proceedings
Time period covered by data	February 1994-February 1996	1987-1993	1981-2001
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Unemployed, duration less than 12 months	Men aged 20-59 years (p. 244)	Individuals between the ages 20 and 50 and who take up UI benefits within 28 days of job loss and who have worked at their prior employer for at least one year, have worked for between 33 and 38 months in the past 5 years. (p. 114)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	The individual is required to have worked for at least 180 days during the last year (p.95)	UI was only paid to employees (excluding civil servants and domestic workers) who did not quit their job voluntarily, and who had made contributions for at least 6 months over the previous 48 months. (p. 242)	In Austria, job losers who have worked for 12 months or more in the preceding two years are eligible for benefits… (p. 114)
Benefit level/replacement rate	Benefits were almost equal to the official minimum wage (p. 96). 36 % of the economy-wide average wage in the previous quater (p.95)	78% in the first 6 months, 67% in months 7-12, 65% thereafter (net replacement rates were quite a lot higher) (p. 247)	55% of the previous (after-tax) wage. (p. 114)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Social assistance benefits - 28% of the economy-wide average wage in the previous quarter (p. 96)	UA	UA - on average 38% of the UI benefit level (p. 7 in discussion paper)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	12 months (p. 98)	Table 2 (p. 248)	Individuals with fewer than 36 months of employment can receive up to 20 weeks of benefits, while those who have worked for 36 months or more can receive 30 weeks of UI. (p. 114)

Destination	Employment, not in the labour force, remained unemployed (table 1, p. 97)	Employment	Job or unemployment exit
Sampling frequency	Quarterly (p. 96)	Monthly	Weekly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Quarterly	Monthly	Weekly
Sample size	7,339 persons (table 1, p. 97)	329,947 spells (p. 245)	92,969 spells - 47% are eligible for 20 weeks of UI, and 53% are eligible for 30 weeks of UI. (p. 114)
Are the labor market conditions described?	Mid 1990s = 14-16% unemployed (p. 95)	Yes - table 1 (p. 246)	Yes - unemployment rate of an average of 4.1% over the 1993-2004 period (p. 6 in discussion paper)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	"We never found the heterogeneity variance to be statistically significant, and all other parameter estimates were very similar to the corresponding ones in models excluding unobserved heterogeneity. (p. 244)	NA
Censoring level	73% (p. 97)	Censoring level is unclear but probably 0 (spells ending in exhaustion is treated as censored (59%), 27 spells ended in employment and 14% ended for other reasons).	0,06
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes	Yes

Author	Jurajda, Tannery	Addison, Portugal	Belzil
Year	2003	2004	2001
Country	USA	USA	Canada
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Industrial and Labor Relations Review	IZA Discussion Paper	Journal of Applied Econometrics
Time period covered by data	January 1980-December 1985	1996-1998	1976-1984
Type of data used	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI with extension (EB + FSC)	UI	UI
Target group	Table 1 (p. 330)	Included: those who wanted but never found employment after losing their jobs and those who transitioned directly into reemployment. Excluded: individuals who were not economically active at the time of the Questionnaire, part-time workers, employed in agriculture, aged less than 20 years and above 61 years. (p. 9-10)	Young males between 18 and 25 years (p. 625)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	In order to collect the EB or FSC benefit extensions, the unemployed first have to exhaust their regular UI benefits. (p. 332)	NA	Basically, those individuals who have worked more than a minimum number of weeks (10 to 14 weeks depending on the regional unemployment rate) can qualify for unemployment benefit. (p. 623)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	NA	66% of insurable earnings (p. 624)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	NA	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Regular UI benefits: 30 weeks before 1984 and 26 weeks after 1984 (p. 331)	26 or 30 weeks	Difference between "before September 1977" and "After September 1977" is 3 weeks. (p. 623-624). The mean initial benefit duration in data is 33 weeks but with SD=14 weeks. (p. 625) It is calculated based on the number of weeks worked during the previous year, up to a certain maximum which may depend itself on the local rate of unemployment (p.624)
Destination	Job or recall	Employment	Job (p. 625)
Sampling frequency	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly
Sample size	6,658 spells for 5,134 individual workers (p. 329)	2,762 individuals (p. 10)	909 individuals (p. 625)
Are the labor market conditions described?	Yes - unemployment rate reaching 9.9% in Philadelphia and 16.9% in Pittsbrugh (p. 325)	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 328) - felxible nonparametric approach	Yes (p. 6)	Yes (p. 629)
Censoring level	14.4% (p. 329)	7-13%	0,02
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 6)	Yes (p. 629)

Author	Terrell, Sorm	Schmieder, von Wachter, Bender	Vodopivec
Year	1999	2009	1995
Country	Czech Republlic	Germany	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Comparative Economics	Columbia University, Department of Economics	Policy research working paper
Time period covered by data	October 1992-September 1994	1987-1999	1990-1992
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Table 3 (p. 44)	Age range 40 to 49	NA
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Anyone who worked for at least 12 months in the preceding 3 years was immediately eligible for unemployment benefits. (p. 38)	Workers who lose their job withour fault (p. 13)	At least nine-months of uninterrupted employment has been required. (p. 5)
Benefit level/replacement rate	60% of the person's previous net wage (p. 38)	63 % of previous net earnings (individual without children)	Before February 1991: 60% (except 80% for those unemployed due to bankruptcy). After February 1991: 70% the first 3 months, 60% thereafter. (p. 25)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Social assistance (p. 38)	53 %, but UA are reduced substantially by spousal earnings and other sources of income.	Before February 1991: Means-tested and equal to minimum wage. After February 1991: Means-tested and equal to 80% of minimum wage (p. 25)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	No	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	6 months (p. 38)	Depends on the age at the beginning of the UI spell.	Depends on the duration of previous employment - from 3 to 24 months. (p. 5) Table 2 (p. 25)
Destination	Employment (p. 39)	Employment	Employment or non-employment (p. 10)
Sampling frequency	Weekly (p.35)	Day-to-day	Daily

Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly	Monthly	Monthly
Sample size	Recipients = 1689 individuals. Nonrecipients = 1218 individuals. (Table 3, p.44)	351731 spells	23,242 spells (table 3, p. 27)
Are the labor market conditions described?	Yes (table 1, p. 34)	NA	Yes (p. 3 and table 1, p. 24)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 40)	No	No
Censoring level	NA	0,23	0,56
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 28 + 59)	Yes

Author	Boeri, Steiner	Caliendo, Tatsiramos, Uhlendorff	Van Ours, Vodopivec
Year	1998	2009	2004
Country	Poland	Germany	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Konjunkturpolitik: Zeitschrift für angewandte Wirtschaftforschung	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung	IZA Discussion Paper
Time period covered by data	January 1990-December 1993	2001-2003	Unemployment spells that started during August 1, 1997-July 31, 1998 and January 1, 1998-December 31, 1999
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	NA	Sample A: Restricts the sample to men and women from West Germany who have been employed for at least 36 months in the last seven years when entering unemployment. Restricts the sample to men aged between 44 and 46 and between 43.5 and 46.5 for women. Sample B: individuals who have been working for 12 months in regular employment in the year prior to entering unemployment. (p. 10) Table A.1 and A.2 p. 30-31	21-50 years of age (p.9)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Before the change in 1992: almost universal coverage and open-ended. After the change: benefits was confined to those with a least 180 working days in the last year. (p. 290)	To generate a claim for UB workers had to be employed for at least 12 months in the last three years before entering unemployment. (p. 6)	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate	Before the change: benefit levels were earnings-related. After the change: flat-rate system, providing to everybody 36 % of the average wage in the previous quarter. (p. 290)	The replacement rate depends on family status. Unemployed persons with at least one child are entitled to 67 % of previous net remuneration and 60 % otherwise, individual means or needs are not taken into account. (p. 6)	Average UB amounting 37% of the average wage (p. 6)

Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Only a relatively small group would seem to qualify for social assistance - if not qualified the individual will experience significant income losses. The shift from unemployment benefit rolls to social assistance involves a reduction in cash transfers of about 20 percent. (p. 292)	UA = 57 %/53 % with/without children. SA = means-tested and flat-rate basis. (p. 6-7)	Unemployment assistance - means-tested (p. 5)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	No
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Before the change: open-ended. After the change: 12 months (p. 290)	The duration depends on age and previous employment duration. At the age og 45 (which is the focus in this study) the maximum benefit duration increases by 6 months - from 12 to 18 months given the workers have been employed for at least 36 months in the last seven years. (p. 6)	Before the reform: 5-10 years of work experience=9 months, 10-15 years=12 months. After the reform: 6 months for both groups (p. 6)
Destination	Employment or non-participation	Employment	Job or other destinations
Sampling frequency	Monthly	Daily basis (p. 10)	Daily
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly	Monthly (p. 10)	Monthly
Sample size	NA	Sample A: 3,432 males and 3,784 females. Sample B: 2,200 males and 2,700 females. (p. 10)	12,752 males, 17,585 females (p. 21)
Are the labor market conditions described?	The choice of Warsaw and Ciechanov aims at capturing two polar cases of labour market adjustment. (p. 293)	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	No	Yes (p. 14)	Yes (p. 12)
Censoring level	NA	25-30 % (p. 11)	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 8, 12, 16)	Yes

Author	Schmitz, Steiner	Sanz	Katz, Meyer
Year	2007	2010	1990
Country	Germany	Spain	USA
Language	English	English	English
Journal	IZA Discussion Paper	ECON working paper	The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Time period covered by data	1995-2003	2000-2007	1979-1981
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers + Questionnaire
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	See table A3 for sample characteristics	Spanish workers aged between 18 and 55. (p. 12) Main sample statistics in table 2 (p. 31)	UI recipients from Missouri (p. 7)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Requirements are determined according to age, see table 1 (p.3) One has to be registered as unemployed at the local labour office, be not older than 65 years and available for work on short notice and prepared to accept "suitable" job offers. (p. 3)	All employees who involuntarily become unemployed are entitled to UI benefits, provided that they were employed for at least 12 months over the 72-month period prior to unemployment. (p. 5)	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate	Individuals with children: 67% of their former net income, without children: 60% (p. 4)	70% of average basic pay for the first 4 months - 60% from the fifth month onwards. (p. 5)	Maximum weekly benefit was $105 in Missouri (p. 13)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	UA - with children: 57% of former net earnings, 53% without children (p. 4)	UA benefits (p. 6)	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Depends on the number of months worked in the last seven years and the age of the claimant - see table 1 (p. 3)	At least 4 months extendable in 2-monthly periods up to a maximum of 2 years, depending on the worker's employment record. (p. 6)	26 weeks in Missouri. After May 1980: 45 weeks in Missouri. (p. 13)
Destination	Employment or out-of-the-labour-force (p. 8)	Recall or new job entry (p. 22)	Recall or new job

Sampling frequency	Monthly (p. 8)	Monthly	Weekly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly (p. 8)	Monthly	Weekly
Sample size	7,348 spells used - 4,612 individuals (p. 8)	NA	756 individuals
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	Yes (table 2, p. 31)	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 5)	Yes (p. 15)	Yes (p. 31)
Censoring level	0,19	10-13%	9.3% (p. 24)
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes (p. 7)	Yes	Yes (p. 26)

Author	Arranz, Bulló, Muro	Jones	Boone, van Ours
Year	2008	1995	2009
Country	Spain	Canada	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal		Human Resources Development Canada	IZA Discussion Paper
Time period covered by data	1987-1997	January 31-March 7 1992 + April 25-June 5 1992	1997-20011
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	18-59 years-old who started receiving UI in 1991 and in 1993 (p. 15) + sample characteristics in table 3 (p. 16)	NA	Table B1 (p. 30)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Eligible for UI are workers whose unemployment situation is recognized according to law by the labour authority; i.e., the job was lost involuntarily, including end of a fixed-term contract. Before the reform: Social Security contributions for a minimum of six months during the four years preceding unemployment. After the reform: contributions for a minimum of twelve months during the six years preceding unemployment. (p. 10)	Canadian employers are required to issue a Record of Employment form whenever a job separation occurs. (p. 10)	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate	Before the reform: 80% the first 6 months, 70% from 7. to 12. month, 60% from 13. onwards. After the reform: 70% the first 6 months, 60% the rest of the period (p. 12)	Cohort 1: 60%, cohort 2: 57% (p. 10-11)	70% of the previous wage first 3 months and 60% thereafter (p. 14)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	75% of statutory minimum wage (p.47)	NA	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Before the reform: 6-12 months contribution=3 months, 13-18 months contribution=6 months -> 48+ contributions=24 months. After the reform: 12-17 months contribution=4 months, 18-23 months contribution=6 months -> 72+ contributions=24 months. (p. 10 + table 1, p. 11)	NA	The analysis focuses on individuals that were entitled to benefits for a maximum duration of 6, 9 or 12 months (p. 14)
Destination	Employment	Employment (p. 14)	Permanent and temporary jobs (p. 16)
Sampling frequency	Monthly	Weekly (p. 10)	Daily
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly	Weekly	Monthly
Sample size	1991: 42,029 individuals, 1993: 35,845 individuals (p. 18)	Cohort 1: 5,465 individuals, cohort 2: 5,694 individuals (p. 38)	5,583 males, 6,4778 females (p. 30)
Are the labor market conditions described?	Unemployment rate above 15% after the 1992 crisis (p. 7)	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 29)	Yes (p. 26)	Yes (p. 21)
Censoring level	77.5% in the 1991-sample, 73% in the 1993-sample (p. 18)	0,61	28-34%
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes (p. 29)	Yes (p. 16 note 8)	Yes (p. 17)

1.2. Descriptive data for studies without effect estimate

Author	Gonzalo	Røed, Zhang	Lee, Wilke
Year	2002	2003	2009
Country	Spain	Norway	Germany
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Applied Economics	The Economic Journal	Journal of business & economic statistics
Time period covered by data	First quarter of 1989-last quarter of 1991	1990s	1975-1997
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Unemployed men with labour experience in activities of industry and services with age between 25 and 55 years who belong to the group of wage earners in the private sector. (p. 2179) (table B1 p. 2187)	All workers below 60 years of age who became unemployed in Norway during the 1990s, who has a full time job prior to the unemployment spell and who were eligible for unemployment benefits to start with. (Table 1 p. 193)	Individuals aged 44 to 48 years as the reform affects individuals older than 42 and the group 42-43 gets a short extension and therefore is a bad treatment group. (p. 195) The sample is restricted to males (p. 196)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Individuals who involuntarily left their job do not have any right to get UI benefits. (p. 2180)	The Norwegian unemployment insurance system is compulsory. The only condition for eligibility is a previous yearly earned income above a fairly low threshold. (p. 192)	An unemployed with sufficient amount of working experience. (p. 194)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	The unemployment benefit is calculated as 62.4 % of the labour earnings in the previous calendar year. (p. 192)	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	Means-tested social security support. (p. 192)	Unemployment assistance - depends on previous earnings and it is means tested. (p. 195)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Depends on tenure, table 2 (p.2180)	Benefits can be maintained for up to 156 weeks. (p. 192)	Maximum length increased from 12 to 22 months for the treatment group - remained constant for the control group (12 months). (p. 195)
Destination	Wage employment (p. 2180)	NA	No specific exit, though recalls are not considered (p.9)
Sampling frequency	Quarterly	Monthly (p. 195)	Daily (p. 195)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Quarterly	Monthly	Daily
Sample size	8,873 observations (p. 2187)	58,625 men and 41,874 women (p. 193)	In total: 4,049 spells, of which 2,922 are recorded during the prereform period (p. 197)
Are the labor market conditions described?	Unemployment rate og 18.9 % in the period 1989-1994. (p. 2177)	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 2182)	Yes (p. 195)	NA
Censoring level	27.80 % (p. 2180)	NA	Table 2 + 3 (p. 197)
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes (p. 2182)	Yes (p. 197)	Yes (p. 198)

Author	Lindeboom, Theeuwes	Stancanelli	Ham, Rea
Year	1993	1999	1987
Country	Netherlands	Britain	Canada
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Economica	Applied Economics	Journal of Labor Economics
Time period covered by data	October 1982-October 1984	Summer 1983-Autumn 1984	January 1975-Decmber 1980
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Unemployed, see table A1 (p. 342)	Either married men or single people of either gender living on their own or with their children; they were aged between 20 and 58; they had been "signing on" continuously for three months following the start of their registered unemployment spell. (p. 1045)	Males aged 18-64 years (p. 338)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Involuntarily unemployed private-sector employees who worked at least 130 days in the year preceding unemployment. (p. 331)	NA	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate	Approx. 80% of gross earnings before unemployment, up to a maximum of 210 guilders a day (p. 331)	Flat rate and almost equal to social assistance payments (p. 1044)	Before January 1976: 75% for those with dependents, 67% for all claimants. After January 1976: 67%/60% of insurable earnings. (p. 327)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Unemployment provision - 75% of previous earnings. (p. 331)	Social assistance payments - very close in amount to UI (p. 1044)	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	130 working days = 26 weeks (p. 331)	52 weeks before 1996 (p. 1043)	52 weeks (p. 339)
Destination	NA	Fulltime job (p. 1048)	Job or recall (p. 339)
Sampling frequency	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly (p. 334)

Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly	Weekly	Weekly
Sample size	114 recipients (table A1, p. 343)	1941 unemployed males (p. 1045)	1058 spells, 282 individuals (p. 339)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes	Yes (p. 1047)	Yes (p. 333)
Censoring level	0,32	NA	16% (p. 339)
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes (p. 333)	Yes (p. 1047)	Yes (p. 333)

Author	Katz, Meyer	Lubyova, van Ours	Van Ours, Vodopivec
Year	1990	1997	2006
Country	USA	Slovakia	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Public Economics	European Economic Review	World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
Time period covered by data	1978-1983	1991/92, 1994/95	Unemployment spells that started during August 1, 1997-July 31, 1998 and January 1, 1998-December 31, 1999
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Males from 12 states (p. 57)	NA	For sample statistics see table 2 and 3 (p.27-28)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	NA	NA	The scheme covers most of the working force. The unemployed has to make themselves available several hours a day and register with an unemployment office. (p.5-6)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	Before 1992: 65% of previous wage the first 6 months and 60% the last 6 months. After 1992: 60%/50% in the first/last 3 months. After 1995: Back to pre-1992 level (p. 927)	Earnings related (p. 5)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	NA	Unemployment assistance - means-tested (p. 6)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Most states provided 26 weeks of benefits (p. 58)	Before 1992: 12 months. After 1992: 6 months. After 1995: <30 years=no change, 30-45 years=8 months, >45 years=9 months (p. 927)	Before the reform: 5-10 years of work experience=9 months, 10-15 years=12 months. After the reform: 6 months for both groups (p. 6)
Destination	Recall or employment	Regular job or other reasons (e.g. subsidized jobs, retraining, school) (p. 928)	Employment - focus on secondary outcomes as duration, quality and wage

Sampling frequency	Weekly (p. 60)	Monthly	Daily
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly	Monthly	Monthly
Sample size	3365 males (p. 57)	1991/92: 10,790 observations. 1994/95: 18,603 observations (p. 927)	Males = 6630, females=7245. Wage regression: males=2973, females=3111 (p. 18)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	Yes (p. 926)	Yes (p. 5)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	Yes (footnote p. 931)	Mentioned in table 3 and 4 concerning duration of the job and wages
Censoring level	0,2	NA	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 929)	Yes

Author	Arranz, Muro	Cockx, Ries	Layte, Callan
Year	2004	2004	2001
Country	Spain	Belgium	UK
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Revista de Economica Pública	CESIFO working paper	The Economic and Social Review
Time period covered by data	Individuals who entered UCS during February 1987	January 1997-May 1999	1994-1998
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Questionnaire and administrative registers	Questionnaire
Type of unemployment scheme	UI and UA	UI	UI
Target group	Ages between 18 and 59 years old (p. 141) + table 1 p. 142 for additional characteristics	Less than 50 years, cohabiting with a partner earning some (replacement) labour income. Only women have retained. (p. 4-5) + additional characteristics in table 2 (p. 7)	Table 1 (p. 114)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Minimum contribution period of 6 months during the previous 48 months (p. 154)	The unemployed is required to be available for the labour market and comply to certain administrative rules (p.3)	NA
Benefit level/replacement rate	First 6 months=80% of the person's last salary, 7-12 months=70%, 13-=60% (p. 155)	NA	Mean replacement rate mentioned in the appendix table (p. 126)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	UA - p. 155	NA	Mean unemployment assistance rate mentioned in the appendix table (p. 126)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Calculated by dividing by 2 the number of months contributed, with the constraints that the result had to be integer multiple of 2. (p. 154-155)	Indefinite period with one exception: benefits may be withdrawn after an unemployment duration, ranging from 2 to 8 years, if one is less than 50 years old and partner of someone with a (replacement) income exceeding a particular level. (p. 3)	15 months (p. 112)
Destination	Job	Employment	Employment or inactivity (p. 119)

Sampling frequency	Daily (p. 141)	Monthly	Monthly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Daily	Monthly	Monthly observations (p. 109)
Sample size	11,668 UI claimants, 3,077 UA claimants (p. 141)	Controls=404 individuals, treated=826 individuals (p. 7)	1994: 4,048 households and 9,905 individuals. 1995: 3,584 households and 8,532 individuals. 1998: 2,729 households and 6,324 individuals (p. 108-109)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	No	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 138)	Not relevant	Yes (p. 118)
Censoring level	15-52% (p. 156)	Left-censored (table 2 p. 7)	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes (p. 139-140)	Not relevant	Yes

Author	Puhani	Saarela	Wolff
Year	2000	2000	1997
Country	Poland	Finland	Hungary
Language	English	Swedish	English
Journal	Journal of Population Economics	Ekonomiska Samfundets Tidskrift	The William Davidson Institute
Time period covered by data	1991-1994	1. January - 18. September 1996	December 1992 - January 1993 (p. 5)
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	Unemployment benefit	Intervention group: UI, control group: social benefits (non-insued -> grunddagpenning and arbetsmarknadsstöd) (p. 200)	UI
Target group	Sample from the population above 15 years of age - table 1 (p. 39)	NA	Table 3 p. 33
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	Before the regime change: qualifying conditions were loose, in that one just had to register with the labour office as unemployed in order to draw benefits. After the regime change: school leavers have a 3-month waiting period (p. 36-37)	Intervention group: has to be registered with an unemployment office and meet the requirements of previous working time (26 or 43 weeks in 2 years). Control group: grunddagpenningen is available if the individual meets the working time requirement but isn't registered with an UI office. Arbetsmarknadsstödet is available if the individual does not meet any requirements. (p. 200)	The individuals are required to have worked for at least one year during the previous 4 years. Additionally the individuals were supposed to search actively after a job, to accepts suitable jobs and to co-operate with the labour-centre (p.2)
Benefit level/replacement rate	After the regime change: 36 % of the average wage in the economy during the previous quarter (special rules for school leavers and people in "crisis areas".	Intervention group: 40-65 % of income (p. 200)	Before the change: First phase = 70 %, second phase= 50 %. After the change: First phase=75 %, second phase= 65 % (p. 31)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	Arbetsmarknadsstöd - depends negative on partner's income. 118 FIM per day (p. 200)	Social benefits: 80 % of the minimum pension (p. 3)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	Not compulsory (p. 4)

Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Before the regime change: open-ended. After the regime change: 12 months	700 weekdays (=500 working days) (p. 200)	Ten different entitlement periods, depending on the employment record. Before the change: 135-540 days. After the change: reduced by one third. (p. 2)
Destination	Employment	Exit to employment or no-employment (p. 201)	Employment, subsidized employment, training + retraining and (early) retirement. (p. 5)
Sampling frequency	NA (only available for one variable, which is quarterly)	Daily	Duration of spells measured in days (p. 5)
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Quarterly	Monthly	Monthly
Sample size	4353 men and 4441 women (p. 38)	7309 individuals - treatment=2827 individuals, control=2592 individuals. Excluded=1890 individuals. (p. 200)	54,911 male spells, 25,200 women spells. 37.4 % (=20,519 obs.) of men and 38.1 % (=9,591 obs.) of women are administered by the 1993 benefit provisions. (p. 5)
Are the labor market conditions described?	They mention the rate of unemployment benefit claimants before the regime change (79,0 %) and after the regime change (52,3 %) (p. 37)	NA (only mentioned for 2000 because the study predicts the effect of a new regime change - and use old data to estimate this effect).	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes, they specify the component to be drawn from a discrete distribution with x mass points and restrictions - and it is assumed that the component is orthogonal to the covariates. (p. 37)	NA	NA
Censoring level	NA	NA	39-49% (p. 32)
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	NA	Yes (p. 10)

Author	Gritz, MaCurdy	Fallick	Hunter
Year	1992	1991	1990
Country	USA	USA	USA
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Empirical Economics	Review of Economics and Statistics	Ph.D. thesis
Time period covered by data	1978-mid1985	January 1984	January 1979-summer 1980 (p. 62)
Type of data used	Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Questionnaire
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	Young men, table 3.1 (p. 188) Requirements for participation (p. 187)	Table 1 p. 229	Men aged between 18-65 years (p.65). For further sample statistics see table 3.1 (p.64)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	NA	NA	Table A-2 p. 198
Benefit level/replacement rate	Summary statistics (p. 188)	NA	Average weekly benefit in US in 1979 was $90.
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Summary statistics (p. 188)	NA	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Summary statistics (p. 188)	26 weeks for UI and 39 weeks for extended benefits. (p. 230)	Table A-2 p. 199 - typical maximum period is 26 weeks. (p. 9)
Destination	Employment	Employment (p. 230)	Employment
Sampling frequency	Weekly (p.187)	NA	NA
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Weekly	Weekly data on unemployment duration (p. 231)	NA
Sample size	1409 individuals. Spells for ineligible individuals=2122, spells for eligible nonrecipients=1190, spells for UI recipients=719 (p. 188)	1290 - 62.3 % UI recipients, 36.7 % nonrecipients, 0.9 % don't know. (p. 229)	31,051 households - duration sample=1,816, completed spells=1,124 (p. 64)

Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	NA	Yes - the unemployment rate in 1979 was 5.8 % and 7.5 % in summer 1980. (p. 62)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	NA	NA
Censoring level	NA	NA	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes (p. 231)	Yes (p. 203)

Author	Solon	Moffitt	Steiger
Year	1978	1985	2007
Country	USA	USA	Switzerland
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Monthly labor review	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	Dissertation
Time period covered by data	September 1972-August 1974	1978-1983	Until December 2003
Type of data used	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	NA	Table III.1 (p. 33)	Table 18 (p. 143)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	NA	NA	A person is eligible for unemployment benefits if they satisfy the minimum required duration of contribution to the system within the preceding two years from the date of job loss. The minimum duration is set to 12 months (p. 127)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	Mean net replacement rate: men=0.50, women=0.79 (p. 33)	70 or 80% of the insured salary of their last employment, conditional on the level of income and dependents (p. 127)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	NA	Additional unemployment aid or social assistance (p. 128)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Before February 1974: 26 weeks. After February 1974: 26 weeks + 13 weeks (p. 48)	26 weeks but the program FSB extends benefit duration up to 65 weeks and EB extends up to 39 weeks (p. 2)	Before the change: 2 years. After the change: 18.5 months (p. 128)
Destination	Employment	Employment	Job or left unemployment (p. 143)
Sampling frequency	Questionnaire: 2, 4 and 6 months after the final regular benefit payment (p. 48)	Weekly	Daily

Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Questionnaire: week-by-week information (p. 48)	Weekly	Daily
Sample size	2,213 individuals. Number of cases for no extended benefits=1,041, some extended benefits=1,083, immediate extended benefits=89. (p. 49)	5,167 men, 2,902 women (p. 32)	92,802 persons (p. 140) Different samples (p. 141-143)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	NA	NA
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	NA	NA
Censoring level	NA	NA	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	NA	Yes	No

Author	Micklewright, Nagy	Fujita	Lauringson
Year	1995	2011	2010
Country	Hungary	USA	Estonia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	EUI working papers in economics	Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia working paper	University of Tartu
Time period covered by data	Spells starting in December 1992 and January 1993	January 2004-July 2010 without 2008	2007-2008
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI	UI
Target group	No spells as the result of quit and receivement statutory severance pay (p. 7) Sample characteristics table 1 (p. 37)	The individual can only receive UI if the person did not leave his job voluntarily.	Table 1 (p. 10)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	At least 12 months of work is required in the previous 4 years in order to qualify for any benefits. (p. 4)	If a worker leaves his job voluntarily, he does not qualify for UI benefits (p. 7)	In order to be entitled to receive this benefit, a person has to have made contributions for at least 12 months during the previous 36 months. In addition, only involuntary unemployment is covered. (p. 7)
Benefit level/replacement rate	Before change: Period 1 (two-thirds of the period)=70% of past earnings, period 2=50%. After the change: Period 1 (first quarter)=75%, period 2=60% (p. 5)	NA	50% of the previous average wage during the first 100 days and 40% thereafter. (p. 8)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	Social Benefit= flat-rate equal to cut-off line (two-thirds of minimum wage) (p. 6)	NA	Unemployment allowance - flat-rate. (p. 7)
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Depends on the working experience. Before the change: Min.= 4½ months, Max.=18 months. After the change: Min.=3 months, Max.=12 months. (p. 4)	26 weeks - but after mid 2008 it could be extended. (p. 6)	Contributions for 12 months=180 days, contributions for 56 months=270 days(p. 7-8)

Destination	Job, a government labour market programme, exhaustion of entitlement, or other reasons (p. 13) See table 3 for potential exits (p.39)	Employment or inactivity (p. 2)	Employment
Sampling frequency	Monthly	Monthly (p. 2)	Monthly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly	Monthly	Wage data=monthly (p. 11)
Sample size	92 scheme=50,441 spells, 93 scheme=30,270 spells (p. 8)	114,623 (p. 9)	Number of observations: 180 granted days=2,831, 270 granted days=3,266 (p. 10)
Are the labor market conditions described?	A little (p. 1)	NA	Yes (p. 9)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	NA	Yes (p. 13)	Yes (p. 17-18)
Censoring level	Table 3 (p. 39)	NA	NA
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes	Yes

Author	Gaure, Røed, Westlie	Bennmarker, Carling, Holmlund
Year	2008	2005
Country	Norway	Sweden
Language	English	English
Journal	IZA Discussion Paper	CESIFO working paper
Time period covered by data	1989-2001	2001-2003
Type of data used	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Type of unemployment scheme	UI	UI
Target group	New entrants into registered unemployment not having had any unemployment experience during the past three years prior to the first spell in our data window. (p. 4) Descriptive statistics in table 1 (p. 5)	Excluded disabled workers and workers over age 54. (p. 19)
Target group - eligibility, requirements for benefits	The individual is required to have earned above a certain level before unemployment (60.000 NOK) in the year prior to unemployment. (note 6, p. 17)	420 hours of work during the 12-month period preceding unemployment. (p. 4)
Benefit level/replacement rate	NA	80% of previous earnings (p. 4) Group A is control group - group B, C and D are treatment groups where the treatment is higher benefits. (p. 6)
Benefit level/replacement rate available after exhaustion	NA	NA
Is compulsory activation part of the system?	NA	NA
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits	Before reform: 80 weeks + 13 weeks (+80 weeks). After the reform: 156 weeks. (p. 6)	60 weeks (p. 3)
Destination	Employment, ordinary education, other benefit, ALMP (p. 8)	Employment
Sampling frequency	NA	Weekly
Time interval the outcome measure is based on	Monthly	Weekly (p.19)
Sample size	373,065 individuals (p. 5)	Table 2 (p. 21)
Are the labor market conditions described?	NA	Yes (p. 11)
Is there correction for unobserved heterogeneity?	Yes (p. 8 + 26)	Yes (p. 27)
Censoring level	19.83% (p. 9)	Table 4 (p. 23)
Is there correction for censoring?	Yes	Yes

1.3. Numeric data for studies with effect estimate

Author	Korpi	van Ours, Vodopivec	Portugal, Addison
Year	1995	2006	2008
Country	Sweden	Slovenia	Portugal
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Economica	Journal of Labor Economics	Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2 p. 362	Proportional hazard rate. Table 4 p. 372	Proportional hazard rate. Table 5, p. 411 using only exit to open-ended employment (also available: Fixed-term contract, part time, self-employment, public activity and inactivity)
Time Point (s)	UA (reference: no unemployment benefits): 4-7 months before exhaustion and 0-3 months before exhaustion. UB (reference: no unemployment benefits):7-14 months before exhaustion and 0-6 months before exhaustion	Month of expiration and post expiration (not specified)	1-2 months before expiration, 3-5 months before expiration and 6-11, 12-17 and 18-23 months before expiration (reference: nonrecipients)
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Questionnaire
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard
Statistics	UA: 4-7 months before exhaustion 0.2760 (0.2273) and 0-3 months before exhaustion -0.1403 (0.2558). UB: 7-14 months before exhaustion -0.3291 (0.2420) and 0-6 months before exhaustion -0.6371 (0.4690)	Month of expiration: 0.82 (16.7) males, .91 (18.9) females	1-2 months before expiration: 0.330 (0.481), 3-5 months before expiration: -0.746 (0.444) (reference: nonrecipients)
Notes	Dummy variable coefficients relative to no unemployment benefits (standard errors). Table 2 p. 362. Exit to employment, separated by permanent/temporary also available	Dummy variables (reference no change in PBD) (absolute t-statistic), separated by gender	Dummy variable relative to nonrecipients (standard errors). Only men

Author	Adamchik	Jenkins, García-Serrano	Card, Chetty, Weber
Year	1999	2004	2007
Country	Poland	Spain	Austria
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics	Oxford bulletin of economics and statistics	AEA papers and proceedings
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2, p. 102, estimates for all and separated by gender (also available separated by age and education)	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3, p. 251	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3
Time Point (s)	0-3 months before expiration, 3-6 months before expiration, 6-9 months before expiration and 9-12 months before expiration (reference nonrecipients)	linear spline: 1, 2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-12, 13-18 and 19-24 months away from exhaustion	Exhaustion spline: 9-12 weeks before, 5-8 weeks before, 3-4 weeks before, 1-2 weeks before, 0 weeks before, 1-2 weeks after, 3-4 weeks after, 5-8 weeks after, 9-12 weeks after and more than 12 weeks after
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Cox proportional hazard rate	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Cox proportional hazard rate
Statistics	All: 0-3 months before expiration0.913 (0.080), 3-6 months before expiration 0.453 (0.095) (reference nonrecipients). Men: 0-3 months before expiration 1.101 (0.101), 3-6 months before expiration 0.659 (0.120) (reference nonrecipients). Women: 0-3 months before expiration 0.594 (0.134), 3-6 months before expiration 0.110 (0.160) (reference nonrecipients)	Linear exhaustion spline, months away from exhaustion: 1: 0.115 (0.018), 2: 0.134 (0.013), 3-4: -0.299 (0.017).	Linear exhaustion spline coefficients (The construction is equivalent to dummies): 9-12 weeks before 1.002 (0.022), 5-8 weeks before 1.014 (0.024), 3-4 weeks before 1.042 (0.036), 1-2 weeks before 1.027 (0.042), 0 weeks before 1.148 (0.062), 1-2 weeks after 1.187 (0.050), 3-4 weeks after 1.062 (0.053), 5-8 weeks after 1.012 (0.046), 9-12 weeks after 0.927 (0.048) and more than 12 weeks after 0.782 (0.047)
Notes	Dummy variable relative to nonrecipients (standard errors)	Table 3 , p. 25 Linear exhaustion spline (standard errors)	Table 3, note it is reported as exp(x) (standard errors) (reference more than 12 weeks away)

Author	Jurajda, Tannery	Addison, Portugal	Belzil
Year	2003	2004	2001
Country	USA	USA	Canada
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Industrial and Labor Relations Review	IZA Discussion Paper	Journal of Applied Econometrics
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2, p. 335	Proportional hazard rate. Table 1, appendix	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2, p. 631
Time Point (s)	0-1 week after exhaustion, 1-3 weeks before exhaustion, 4-18 weeks before exhaustion, 19-27 weeks before exhaustion, 28-36 weeks before exhaustion and 37 or more weeks before exhaustion	Before: 1-25 (29) weeks before exhaustion, At: the week of expiration and After: 1 or more weeks after expiration	exhaustion spline: 1-5 weeks before, 6-9, 10,19, 20-29 and more than 29 weeks before
Source	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard
Statistics	0-1 week after exhaustion: 1.627 (0.097), 1-3 weeks before exhaustion: -0.105 (0.110), 4-18 weeks before exhaustion: -0.812 (0.103)	At: the week of expiration 1.265 (0.231)	exhaustion spline: 1-5 weeks before: -0.3076 (3.01), 6-9: -0.1978 (2.27), 10-19: -0.0567 (2.02), 20-29: 0.0126 (1.18) and more than 29 weeks before: -0.0307 (0.83)
Notes	Dummy variable coefficient (standard errors). Estimates based on the pooled sample allowing for unobserved heterogeneity (column 2, table 2). New job estimates, recall also available. Reference is 2 or more weeks after exhaustion	Dummy relative to nonrecipients (the author states it is asymptotic t-statistic but that must be a mistake. We treat it as a standard error) column 1	Exhaustion spline coefficients (asymptotic t-ratios). Measured as moving one week away from exhaustion (effect of moving one week closer in the interval 1-5 is the sum of all coefficients multiplied by -1)

Author	Terrell, Sorm	Schmieder, von Wachter, Bender	Vodopivec
Year	1999	2009	1995
Country	Czech Republlic	Germany	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Comparative Economics	Columbia University, Department of Economics	Policy research working paper
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 4, p. 47	Proportional hazard rate. Table 11, p. 39	Proportional hazard rate. Table 4, p. 28. Estimate for all and separate divided by entitlement
Time Point (s)	0-1 week before exhaustion and all weeks after exhaustion (not specified)	Last month of UI. Differs by age, separated by age thresholds 42, 44 and 49	Exhaustion spline: monthly (except the last) in the interval 23 months before exhaustion to 2 (or more) months after exhaustion
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Discrete time logistic hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate	Cox proportional hazard rate
Statistics	0-1 week before exhaustion: men: 1.023 (0.304), women: 0.401 (0.301)	Age threshold 42 (entitlement of 18 months compared to 12): -0.024 (0.0025), age threshold 44 (entitlement of 22 months compared to 18): -0.013 (0.0022) and age threshold 49 (entitlement of 26 months compared to 22): -0.015 (0.0023)	SPL-2 (2 or more months after) -0.129 (0.097), SPL-I (one month after) -1.121 (0.123), SPLO (month of expiration) 0.155 (0.080), SPLI (1 month before) 0.694 (0.088) and SPL2 (2 months before) 0.324 (0.132)
Notes	Dummy variable separated by gender	RD-design. Local linear regressions (different slopes) on each side of age cutoff (standard errors). Negative coefficients as treated have higher entitlement than control (entitlement of 18 months compared to 12, entitlement of 22 months compared to 18 and entitlement of 26 months compared to 22)	Table 4, p. 28, spline coefficients (standard error). Model 1, total. Also available separated by entitlement.

Author	Boeri, Steiner	Caliendo, Tatsiramos, Uhlendorff	Van Ours, Vodopivec
Year	1998	2009	2004
Country	Poland	Germany	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal	Konjunkturpolitik: Zeitschrift für angewandte Wirtschaftforschung	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung	IZA Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 1-4, p.303-6	Proportional hazard rate. Table 4 p. 22	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3, p. 28
Time Point (s)	month of expiration and after expiration (not specified). 3rd degree polynomial of remaining months also included	9-11 months before, 6-8 months before, 3-5 months before, 0-2 months before, 1-3 months after, 4-6 months after	1 month before exhaustion, month of exhaustion and 1 month after exhaustion
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (multinomial logit hazard) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard
Statistics	Warsaw: men: 0.046 (0.56), women: 0.197 (3.08). Ciechanow, men: -0.091 (-0.27) and women: 0.368 (0.84)	MEN: 3-5 months before: 0.044 (0.196), 0-2 months before: −0.614 (0.209), 1-3 months after: −0.190 (0.223). WOMEN: 3-5 months before: −0.098 (0.165), 0-2 months before: −0.734 (0.170), 1-3 months after: −0.318 (0.186)	1 month before exhaustion: men -0.01 (0.2), women 0.06 (0.1), month of exhaustion: men 0.78 (16.4), women 0.87 (19.9) and 1 month after exhaustion: men 0.44 (6.5), women 0.29 (4.4)
Notes	Table 1-4, p.303-6. Dummy (t-value) separated by region and gender. Into employment (non-participation also available).	Dummy coefficients (T/C) interacted with duration (standard error), sample B (fresh spells), table 4 p. 22. Negative coefficients as treated (entitlement of 18 months) are compared to controls (entitlement of 12 months)	Dummy coefficient (not reported but must be t-value) table 3, p. 28. separated by gender

Author	Scmitz, Steiner	Sanz	Katz, Meyer
Year	2007	2010	1990
Country	Germany	Spain	USA
Language	English	English	English
Journal	IZA Discussion Paper	ECON working paper	The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 5, p. 16	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3, p.34	Proportional hazard rate. Table 6, p. 995
Time Point (s)	month of expiration, 1 month before, 2 month before, 3-4 months before, 5-6, 7-8, 9-12 and 13-18 months before. Minimum 1 months after exhaustion.	minimum 4 months before exhaustion, 2-3 months before exhaustion, 1 months before, month of exhaustion, 1 month after, 2-3 months after and 4-5 month after exhaustion	week of exhaustion, 1 week before exhaustion, 2-5 weeks before, 6-10 weeks before and minimum 1 week after
Source	Questionnaire	Administrative registers	Administrative registers + Questionnaire
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (multinomial logit) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Discrete-time competing hazard (complementary log-log) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Cox proportional hazard rate
Statistics	month of expiration: West: men 0.47 (1.92), women 0.928 (3.23). East: men 0.699 (2.78), women 0.732 (2.59), 1 month before: West: men 0.189 (0.74), women 0.538 (1.88). East: men 0.561 (2.25), women 0.375 (1.30), 2 month before: West: men 0.005 (0.02), women 0.317 (1.07), East: men 0.169 (0.65), women 0.488 (1.74), 3-4 months before: West: men 0.462 (2.42), women 0.626 (2.93), East: men 0.157 (0.78), women 0.446 (1.88)	2-3 months before exhaustion: Recall: men-0.738 (-5.9), women -0.330 (-3.5), Diff. Firm: men -1.012 (-8.9), women -0.815 (-8.2), 1 months before: Recall: men 0.429 (2.5), women 1.493 (15.8), Diff. firm: men -0.542 (-3.7), women -0.248 (-2.0), month of exhaustion: Recall: men 0.433 (1.8), women 1.409 (8.5), Diff. firm: men 0.056 (0.4), women 0.175 (1.5), 1 month after: Recall: men -0.577 (-1.9), women -0.061 (0.4), Diff. firm: men -0.855 (-5.3), women -0.734 (-5.2), 2-3 months: Recall: men -0.688 (-2.3), women 0.526 (2.4), Diff. firm: men -0.795 (-5.5), women -0.820 (-6.1) after	Week of exhaustion: Total: 0.928 (0.235), recall: 0.835 (0.371), new job: 0.789 (0.329), 1 week before exhaustion: Total: 0.393 (0.300), recall: 0.385 (0.479), new job: 0.410 (0.405), 2-5 weeks before: Total: -0.090 (0.194), recall: -0.045 (0.273), new job: -0.164 (0.291), 6-10 weeks before: Total: -0.167 (0.146), recall: -0.166 (0.208), new job: -0.182 (0.220), 1 week after: Total: -0.636 (0.732), recall: -0.470 (0.416), new job: -1.423 (0.976)
Notes	Dummy coefficient (t-value) table 3, p. 28. separated by gender and region	Dummy coefficient (t-statistic) separated by gender, recall/not recall and permanent contract in previous job/ temporary contract in previous job. Only exhaustion estimates for involuntary unemployed	Dummy coefficients (standard errors) relative to 11 or more weeks before exhaustion. Total and separate for recall and new job

Author	Arranz, Bulló, Muro	Jones	Boone, van Ours
Year	2008	1995	2009
Country	Spain	Canada	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English
Journal		Human Ressources Development Canada	IZA Discussion Paper
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 7, p. 33	Proportional hazard rate. Table 10+11, very different results dependent upon which controls are included	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2, p. 37, panel C (with flexible duration dependence)
Time Point (s)	month of exhaustion, 1-3 months before, 4-6 months before, 7-12, 13-18 and 19-24 months before	1-3 weeks before expiration, 4-6 weeks before and 7-12 weeks before	month of expiration
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers + Questionnaire	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Discrete-time hazard (complementary log-log) with piecewise constant baseline hazard.	Cox proportional hazard rate	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard
Statistics	month of exhaustion: is reference, 1-3 months before: -0.134 (0.031), 4-6 months before: -0.243 (0.033), 7-12: -0.189 (0.031), 13-18: -0.147 (0.034) and 19-24: 0.061 (0.038) months before	1-3 weeks before expiration, 4-6 weeks before and 7-12 weeks before	month of expiration: Permanent job: men 1.63 (11.3), women 1.60 (11.6), Temporary job: men 0.59 (6.1), women 0.66 (7.8)
Notes	Dummy coefficients (standard error). Table 7, p. 33, model 2	Table 10 or 11 page 48-50, very different results dependent upon which controls are included	Dummy coefficients (absolute t-statistic), table 2, p. 37, panel C (with flexible duration dependence). Distinguish between permanent/temporary job and separated by gender.

1.4. Numeric data/reason for not in the data synthesis for studies without effect estimate

Author	Gonzalo	Røed, Zhang	Lee, Wilke	Lindeboom, Theeuwes	Stancanelli	Ham, Rea
Year	2002	2003	2009	1993	1999	1987
Country	Spain	Norway	Germany	The Netherlands	Britain	Canada
Language	English	English	English	English	English	English
Journal	Applied Economics	The Economic Journal	Journal of business & economic statistics	Economica	Applied Economics	Journal of Labor Economics
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate	Figure of relative hazard rate	Survival probability, bounds analysis, figure only	Proportional hazard rate	The presence of an unemployment benefit exhaustion effect is tested by means of likelihood ratio tests, having allowed the baseline hazard to shift for the unemployed that expect their benefit to exhaust. (p. 1047) Test statistic not reported	Proportional hazard rate
Time Point (s)	Time to exhaustion not specified			Time to exhaustion not specified, second-order polynomial for remaining weeks		Time to exhaustion not specified

Author	Katz, Meyer	Lubyova, van Ours	van Ours, Vodopivec	Arranz, Muro	Cockx, Ries	Layte, Callan
Year	1990	1997	2006	2004	2004	2001
Country	USA	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Belgium	UK
Language	English	English	English	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Public Economics	European Economic Review	World Bank Policy Research Working Paper	Revista de Economica Pública	CESIFO working paper	The Economic and Social Review
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Continuous	Time-to-Event	Dichotomous	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Kaplan-Meyer figure of exit to job without time to exhaustion specified.	Proportional hazard rate	No transition estimates reported, only probability of finding a permanent job to overall probability of finding a job (permanent and temporary). Wage change in post-unemployment job compared to pre-unemployment	Proportional hazard rate	Monthly employmennt probability difference	Proportional hazard rate
Time Point (s)	Time to exhaustion not specified	Time to exhaustion not specified	Month of expiration and post expiration (not specified).	Time to exhaustion not specified	3 months before, 2 months before, 1 month before, month of exhaustion, 3 months after, 6 month after, 12 months after and 14 months after (table 5, p. 17)	Time to exhaustion not specified

Author	Puhani	Saarela	Wolff	Gritz, MaCurdy	Fallick	Hunter
Year	2000	2000	1997	1992	1991	1990
Country	Poland	Finland	Hungary	USA	USA	USA
Language	English	Swedish	English	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Population Economics	Ekonomiska Samfundets Tidskrift	The william Davidson Institute	Empirical Economics	Review of Economics and Statistics	Ph.d. thesis
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate	Figure of baseline hazard, no confidence interval.	Proportional hazard rate	Survival probability	Proportional hazard rate	Proportional hazard rate for unemployment exit (to employment). Wage following unemployment with duration (continuous variable) and initial entitlement in covariates (no exhaustion effect)
Time Point (s)	Time to exhaustion not specified		Not specified for exits to employment (only specified for exits to subsidised employment and training)	Time to exhaustion not specified	Time to exhaustion not specified	Time to exhaustion not specified

Author	Solon	Moffitt	Steiger	Micklewright, Nagy	Fujita	Lauringson
Year	1978	1985	2007	1995	2011	2010
Country	USA	USA	Switzerland	Hungary	USA	Estonia
Language	English	English	English	English	English	English
Journal	Monthly labor review	Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper	Dissertation	EUI working papers in economics	Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia working paper	University of Tartu
Type of outcome data	Continuous	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Average employment weeks in the 26 weeks following exhaustion of regular benefits	Proportional hazard rate	Employment probability, matching and RD	Non-parametric HR for two groups (separate) with different entitlement, figures only	Proportional hazard rate	Proportional HR for two groups (separate) with different entitlement.
Time Point (s)	0-26 weeks after exhaustion of regular benefits	Time to exhaustion not specified	Time to exhaustion not specified		Time to exhaustion not specified	Time to exhaustion not specified

Author	Gaure, Røed, Westlie	Bennmarker, Carling, Holmlund
Year	2008	2005
Country	Norway	Sweden
Language	English	English
Journal	IZA Discussion Paper	CESIFO working paper
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate, exit from unemployment and exit from employment (and monthly earnings). Figures only	Proportional hazard rates
Time Point (s)	Month of expiration and 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 months before exhaustion (for all outcomes)	Time to exhaustion not specified

1.5. Numeric data for studies with effect estimate and used for secondary outcome analysis

Author	Belzil	van Ours, Vodopivec	Caliendo, Tatsiramos, Uhlendorff	Sanz	Gaure, Røed, Westlie	Boone, van Ours
Year	2001	2006	2009	2010	2008	2009
Country	Canada	Slovenia	Germany	Spain	Norway	Slovenia
Language	English	English	English	English	English	English
Journal	Journal of Applied Econometrics	World Bank Policy Research	DIW	WP ECON	IZA	IZA
Type of outcome data	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event	Time-to-Event
Outcome	Proportional hazard rate. Table 2, p. 631 , employment hazard	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3, p. 28.	Proportional hazard rate. Table 5 p. 23	Employment hazard, but no exhaustion effect estimated (only entry requirement effect)	Proportional hazard rate, exit from employment (and monthly earnings). Figures only	Proportional hazard rate. Table 3, p. 38)
Time Point (s)	Exhaustion spline: 1-5 weeks before, 6-9, 10,19, 20-29 and more than 29 weeks before	Month of expiration and post expiration (not specified).	9-11 months before, 6-8 months before, 3-5 months before, 0-2 months before, 1-3 months after, 4-6 months after			Month of expiration and post expiration (not specified).
Source	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers	Administrative registers
Method of estimation	Proportional hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard			Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard
Statistics	Exhaustion spline: 1-5 weeks before: -0.0247 (1.88), 6-9: -0.0393 (1.68)	Month of expiration: Permanent job: men -0.13 (0.8), women 0.07 (0.5), Temporary job: men -0.15 (2.2), women -0.10 (1.1)	MEN: 0-2 months before: −0.338 (0.294). WOMEN: 0-2 months before: −0.133 (0.254)			month of expiration: Permanent job: men -0.35 (2.3), women 0.08 (0.3), Temporary job: men -0.26 (2.0), women 0.01 (0.1)

| Notes | Exhaustion spline coefficients (asymptotic t-ratios). Measured as moving one week away from exhaustion (effect of moving one week closer in the interval 1-5 is the sum of all coefficients multiplied by -1) | Dummy coefficients (absolute t-statistic), table 3, p. 28. Distinguish between permanent/temporary job and separated by gender. | Dummy coefficients (T/C) interacted with duration (standard error), sample B (fresh spells), table 5 p. 23. Negative coefficients as treated (entitlement of 18 months) are compared to controls (entitlement of 12 months) | | | Dummy coefficients (absolute t-statistic), table 3, p. 38. Distinguish between permanent/temporary job and separated by gender. |

2. RISK OF BIAS

2.1. Risk of bias for studies used in data synthesis for primary outcome

Author	Korpi	van Ours, Vodopivec	Portugal, Addison	Adamchik
Year	1995	2006	2008	1999
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	4	3	3	4
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Censoring level not reported. Missing data not reported.	Level of incomplete data not reported (p.358). Censoring level not reported.	Data discussed at page 395-398 and descriptive statistics given in table A1. Missing data level 2%. Censoring level 78-87%	Data discussed at page 96-98 and descriptive statistics given in table 1. Missing data not reported. Censoring level 73%
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	Not relevant	1	3	Not relevant
Free of selective reporting	Not relevant	1	3	Not relevant
Free of other bias (judgment)	Not relevant	1	1	Not relevant
Free of other bias	Not relevant	1	1	Not relevant
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	5	2	3	5
Confounding	No variation in remaining benefit has been modelled (and duration is modelled with dummies), the comparison is simply non-recipients at the same duration level.	-	-	No variation in remaining benefit has been modelled (apparently remaining benefit and duration is identical for all and modelled with dummies); the comparison is simply non-recipients at the same duration level.

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All, except unobservables (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)	All, except ethnicity, unemployment duration, labor market conditions (+ more)
Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	None	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history	Individual variation in entitlement due to age	Reference group is non-recipients
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Effect not identified	Regression	Regression	Effect not identified
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Cox proportional hazard rate

Author	Jenkins, García-Serrano	Card, Chetty, Weber	Jurajda, Tannery	Addison, Portugal
Year	2004	2007	2003	2004
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	2	2	2	3
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Data discussed at page244-247 and descriptive statistics given in table 1. Missing data level 1%. Censoring level is unclear but probably 0 (spells ending in exhaustion is treated as censored (59%), 27 spells ended in employment and 14% ended for other reasons)	Data discussed at page 7-9 and 17-18. Descriptive statistics given in table 2. Missing data level on covariates for the unrestricted sample: 34% of job losses occurring before 1987 and 25% of job losses occurring after 1998.Level in the analysis sample is unclear. Censoring level is 6%	Data discussed at page 328-331 and descriptive statistics given in table 1. Missing data level (including left censored spells) is 14%. Censoring level is 14%. Fresh spells only	Data discussed at page 7-10 and descriptive statistics given in the appendix. Missing data not discussed. Censoring level 7-13%.
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	1	2	3	3
Free of selective reporting	1	2	3	3
Free of other bias (judgment)	1	2	1	1
Free of other bias	1	2	1	1
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	2	3	3	4
Confounding	-	-	-	-

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All (+ more)	All, except unemployment duration and labor market conditions (+ more)	All, except education (+ more)	All (+ more)
Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	Individual variation in entitlement due to employment history	Individual variation in entitlement due to employment history	Legislative changes and variation in entitlement due to extended benefits programs.	Comparison with non-recipients
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Cox proportional hazard rate	Discrete time hazard (logistic) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard

Author	Belzil	Terrell, Sorm	Schmieder, Wachter, Bender	Vodopivec
Year	2001	1999	2009	1995
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	2	4	4	4
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Data discussed at page 624-626 and descriptive statistics given in table 1. Missing data level is 1%. Censoring level is 2%. Involuntary job loss and no recall only.	Data discussed at page 43-45 and descriptive statistics given in table 3. Missing data level not reported and not discussed. Censoring level not reported. Only recipients.	Data discussed at page 7-8, descriptive statistics in table 2. Missing data not mentioned. Censoring level not mentioned. Only fresh spells with max. entitlement for their age group	Data discussed at page 12, censoring level high (56%)
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	3	3	Not relevant	4
Free of selective reporting	3	3	Not relevant	4
Free of other bias (judgment)	1	1	Not relevant	2
Free of other bias	1	1	Not relevant	2
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	3	4	5	3
Confounding	-	-	The authors test the RD assumption by testing whether observable characteristics (Education, gender, foreign citizen, pre wage, tenure in last job, tenure in occupation, tenure in industry and experience) vary continuously at the points of discontinuity. Further they look at the smoothness of the density around the	-

			cutoffs and discuss the results.	
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All, except education, ethnicity and labor market conditions ((+ more)	All (+ more)	Age and unobservables. "It turns out that for most of the outcomes we consider, in particular unemployment and non-employment durations, other variables in our dataset have little explanatory power (partly because we estimate our model on a relatively homogenous sample of workers) The efficiency gain from this is very small, so that we prefer to present the raw estimates without controlling for additional variables." (page 9)	All except unemployment duration, labor market condition (+ more)
Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history and local unemployment rate.	Individual variation in entitlement due to late registration and multiple spells	Individual variation in entitlement due to age	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression
Method of estimation	Proportional hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard	Discrete time logistic hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate	Cox proportional hazard rate

Author	Boeri, Steiner	Caliendo, Tatsiramos, Uhlendorff	van Ours, Vodopivec	Schmitz, Steiner
Year	1998	2009	2004	2007
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	4	3	4	2
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Data discussed at page 292-293, censoring level not mentioned. Missing data not mentioned.	Data discussed at page 9-10. Missing data not discussed. Censoring level 25-30%	Data discussed at page 7-10 and 14-15. Censoring level not mentioned. Missing data not mentioned.	Data discussed at page 8-12. Missing data reported. Censoring level 19%
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	4	1	1	3
Free of selective reporting	4	1	1	3
Free of other bias (judgment)	2	1	1	1
Free of other bias	2	1	1	1
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	3	3	2	1
Confounding	-	-	-	-
Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All except ethnicity (+ more)	All (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)	All (+ more)

Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history and reason for unemployment.	Individual variation in entitlement due to age. Regression discontinuity design	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history and age
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression
Method of estimation	Discrete time hazard (multinomial logit hazard) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Discrete time hazard (multinomial logit) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard

Author	Sanz	Katz, Meyer	Arranz, Bulló, Muro	Jones	Boone, van Ours
Year	2010	1990	2008	1995	2009
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	2	2	3	3	3
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Data discussed at page 10-14. Missing data not discussed. Censoring level 10-13%	Data discussed at page 975-979. Missing data reported but not discussed. Censoring level 9%	Data discussed at page 14-18. Missing data not discussed. Censoring level 73-77.5%	Data discussed at page 9-13. Missing data discussed (attrition rate is 19.9) and sensitivity analysis carried out. "some sensitivity testing for the effects of attrition was conducted, and it was concluded that attrition does not seem to drive the main patterns of the results" (p. 13). Censoring level 61%	Data discussed at page 13-14 and table in appendix B. Missing data not reported. Censoring level 28-34%.
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	3	1	1	Not relevant	1
Free of selective reporting	3	1	1	Not relevant	1
Free of other bias (judgment)	1	1	1	Not relevant	1
Free of other bias	1	1	1	Not relevant	1
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	2	2	2	5	2
Confounding	-	-	-	Uses complete disentitlement for dismissals and voluntary quitters	-

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	Discusses the control variables used	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All, except education (+ more)	All except unemployment duration (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)	All, except unemployment duration (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)
Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	Individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history.	Extensions of benefits through federal programs and individual variation in entitlement due to differences in base period and high quarter earnnings. (p. 979)	Legislative changes and individual variation due to labor market history	Legislative changes	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression
Method of estimation	Discrete-time competing hazard (complementary log-log) with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Cox proportional hazard rate	Discrete-time hazard (complementary log-log) with piecewise constant baseline hazard.	Cox proportional hazard rate	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard

2.2. Risk of bias for studies used in data synthesis for secondary outcome

Author	Belzil	van Ours, Vodopivec	Caliendo, Tatsiramos, Uhrendorff	Boone, van Ours
Year	2001	2006	2009	2009
Sequence generation (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Allocation concealment (judgment)	High	High	High	High
Blinding (judgment)	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant	Not relevant
Incomplete outcome data addressed (judgment)	2	3	3	3
Incomplete outcome data addressed	Data discussed at page 624-626 and descriptive statistics given in table 1. Missing data level is 1%. Censoring level is 2%. Involuntary job loss and no recall only.	Data discussed at page 7-8. Missing data not reported. Censoring level 28-34%.	Data discussed at page 9-10. Missing data not discussed. Censoring level 25-30%	Data discussed at page 13-14 and table in appendix B. Missing data not reported. Censoring level 28-34%.
Free of selective reporting (judgment)	3	1	1	1
Free of selective reporting	Unobserved heterogeneity included	Unobserved heterogeneity included. Sensitivity analysis, bivariate duration model (p. 17)	Sensitivity analysis (p. 15). Among other things unobserved heterogeneity. "Modeling unobserved heterogeneity significantly improves the model fit", "The effect of extended benefit duration does not differ qualitatively between the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity" (estimates not reported)	Sensitivity analysis, three duration specifications (p. 18). Unobserved heterogeneity included.
Free of other bias (judgment)	1	1	1	1
Free of other bias	-	-	-	-
A priori protocol (judgment)	No	No	No	No
A priori analysis plan (judgment)	No	No	No	No
Confounding (judgment)	3	2	3	2
Confounding	-	-	-	-

Method for identifying relevant confounders described by researchers	No	No	No	No
Relevant confounders described	All, except education, ethnicity and labor market conditions ((+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)	All (+ more)	All, except ethnicity (+ more)
Method used for controlling for confounding at design stage	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history and local unemployment rate.	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history	Individual variation in entitlement due to age. Regression discontinuity design	Legislative changes and individual variation in entitlement due to labor market history
Method used for controlling for confounding at analysis stage	Regression	Regression	Regression	Regression
Method of estimation	Proportional hazard rate with Weibull baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard	Proportional hazard rate with piecewise-constant baseline hazard