Title registration for a systematic review:

What are the social, economic, psychological and environmental risk factors that lead to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism?
Yael Litmanovitz, David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, Michael Wolfowicz

Submitted to the Coordinating Group of:

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TITLE OF THE REVIEW

What are the Social, Economic, Psychological and Environmental Risk Factors That Lead to Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism?: A Systematic Review

BACKGROUND

Perhaps one of the most pressing issues facing the world today is that of the threat of radicalization and terrorism. Whilst terrorism affects almost every country in the world to some extent, the threat of terrorism has increased exponentially in democratic and semi-democratic countries (especially the OECD). The most current figures state that OECD countries experienced a 650% increase in terrorism related deaths between 2014 and 2015, with many of the attacks having been linked to or inspired by the Islamic State (ISIS) (GTI, 2016). The last year has been witness to many high-profile attack in Europe, namely in Paris and Brussels. There have also been a significant number of attacks which were foiled by intelligence and security services (Europol, 2016; MFA, 2016). Terrorism affects us in many ways, not only causing death and destruction but also having negative impacts on health (Holman et-al, 2008; Deboutte, 2016), economy (Eldor & Melnik, 2004), society (Waxman, 2011) and politics (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman, 1993; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Williams et-al, 2013). Economically, there has been a steady increase in the cost of terrorism over the last decade. For example, terrorism has significant effects on markets and tourism in countries affected by it (Sandler & Enders, 2008; Thompson, 2011; Baker, 2014). The GTI (2016) estimates that in 2015 alone the cost of terrorism reached US$89.6 billion, up from US$52.9 billion in 2014 (GTI, 2015). Certainly, the impacts of terrorism are far reaching and in a sense, difficult to quantify (GTI, 2014).

It has generally been accepted, as reflected in the academic literature as well as in the policies of democratic countries, that terrorism cannot be defeated by force alone. Rather, it has become an accepted wisdom that the way to beat terrorism is to fight against the processes of radicalization and the root causes that underlie such phenomena as well as the transference from radicalization to recruitment. This does not mean that there is an abandonment of policing and security-related counter-measures. Rather, it is considered to be a more effective approach to combat terrorism with a policy that balances active security with efforts to stimmy those factors which lead to radicalization and recruitment to terrorism (White House, 2011; EU, 2014; OSCE, 2014). While radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are two clearly different phenomena, the EU’s approach has been that by tackling radicalization, there
will be a reduced risk and threat of recruitment. The connecting of these two interrelated outcomes is enshrined in the 'EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism' (EU, 2014). This strategy should be supported by and informed by research as it deals with two complicated and entangled process for which much is at stake.

In recent years the EU has worked hard to develop a number of strategies, policies, practices and interventions that seek to reduce or otherwise curb the risk of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism (EU, 2005, 2014). Nevertheless, during this same period there has been a general increase in the number of individuals who ascribe to radical views. Additionally, the recent increase in terrorism events in these countries and elsewhere is a likely indication that their approaches are not having the desired impact or are otherwise unsuccessful. A growing number of terrorists in Europe and elsewhere have sprung up in the form of ‘home-grown’ terrorists who commit violent acts in their own or neighbouring countries, and foreign fighters who travel overseas to join terror organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (EU, 2015). Whilst these are not new issues, the growth of such phenomena has led to increased efforts to combat them.

The issues of radicalization and recruitment are difficult to deal with, in part because while there may be a great number of individuals who hold radical views and ideologies, only a very small percentage will ever move to the stage of recruitment and engage in violent action (Horgan, 2008). It is therefore necessary to identify those factors that may be able to differentiated between these two outcomes of radicalization. As such, it is also important to tackle radicalization in all its forms in order to curb the threat that some percentage of radicalized individuals will inevitably go on to be recruited (EU, 2014; OSCE, 2014).

Most existing/current interventions are targeted at mitigating and reducing the perceived, putative risk factors associated with the root causes that are believed to lead to radicalization and recruitment, primarily social, economic and psychological factors (Lum, Shirley & Kennedy, 2006). Indeed, most democratic countries have some element of economic and social intervention in their counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization policies, as well as their socio-economic policies more generally. Unfortunately, despite the growth in terrorism research, empirical study only accounts for a small percentage of the knowledge and it is believed that this lack of systematic investigation has left it to policy makers to develop policies and strategies that are not only not evidence based but are based on purely theoretical assumptions (Victoroff, 2005; Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). It seems that we don’t actually know much about what risk factors should be being targeted. In a recent systematic
review on risk assessment tools for radicalization, Scarella et-al (2016) found that most tools, including the UK’s ERG22+ are not evidence based. Furthermore, with the important distinction between radicalized and recruited individuals, it is unknown what risk factors may differentiate these two groups and outcomes. This lack of knowledge has two inherent dangers in practice. For example, risk assessment tools like the ERG22+ may identify perfectly normal people as being a threat (‘false positives’), whilst simultaneously misidentifying actual threats (‘false negatives’). It is therefore of great importance to first identify and analyse the significance of risk factors, since only a better understanding will enable the development of more scientifically based and effective interventions and policies (Hawkins et al., 1998; Blum & Ireland, 2004; Piquero et al, 2009).

This review seeks to address this issue by systematically identifying, summarizing and synthesizing the quantitative evidence relating to the social, economic, psychological, and environmental risk factors associated with the two distinct but interrelated outcomes of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. This review takes the approach that radicalization is 'radicalization of belief' or 'cognitive radicalization' and that recruitment is 'radicalization of action' or 'behavioural radicalization' (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, 2017; Neumann, 2013; Khalil, 2014; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). This review takes the approach adopted by the EU that radicalization is "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (EU, 2005), whereas recruitment is where an individual has decided to act on these opinions and ideas and provide actual support for, facilitate or engage in violent actions (EU, 2014). By examining and comparing these two groups or outcomes of radicalization, it may be possible to better identify both the shared and differing risk factors associated with radicalization and recruitment.

**OBJECTIVES**

The primary objectives of this systematic review are to provide information that can help in answering important questions regarding the risk factors associated with radicalization and recruitment to terrorism. Namely, the primary objectives of this review are to identify and collate the different macro and micro risk factors which are grounded in empirical research and for which there is evidence to support their characterization as risk factors, and for which there is evidence regarding the extent to which they are significant. The review aims to provide (where possible), meta-analyses of the different risk factors. As such, this review seeks to explore and identify:
1a) What are the social, economic, psychological, and environmental risk factors associated with radicalization?

1b) What are the social, economic, psychological and environmental risk factors associated with recruitment? What are the shared and differentiating risk factors for the two outcomes of radicalization and recruitment?

2) To what extent are identified risk factors significant and what are their effect sizes?

In addition, the review’s secondary objectives are to:

1) Provide guidance for a secondary systematic review that will focus on anti-radicalisation interventions and how risk factors can be mitigated.

2) Provide data and inputs in the form of effect sizes (such as risk ratios) to be used in the development of agent based modelling.

**EXISTING REVIEWS**

Only five (5) related and relevant systematic reviews have been identified for this topic:


The review conducted by Campana and Lapointe (2012) is in fact a ‘Systematic Scoping Review’ and while not a full systematic review, in many ways it is more methodically and theoretically sound than some of the full reviews. This review, whilst providing some empirical data, focusses only on macro level factors associated with the presence of terrorism events. The ICPC (2015) report and McGilloway et-al (2015) review are both high quality narrative reviews but unfortunately, they provide no meta-analysis and include very little
exploration of the quantitative studies on radicalization and recruitment that have been carried out in a variety of fields. The review conducted by Christmann (2012) is similar in this regard but due to the time at which it was carried out, this review does not include important studies which have been conducted in the last five years. Scarcella et-al's (2016) review focussed on the quality of risk assessment tools, which are meant to be based on risk factors. This review provides some of the direction for the current review in that it found that most risk assessment tools were not evidence based. We have been unable to identify any reviews in progress on this topic. Perhaps one reason is that this type of systematic review does not examine interventions, but rather, through looking at risk causes seeks to determine the extent to which specific factors are significant in the creation of the problem, namely radicalization and recruitment to terrorism.

The proposed systematic review will fill an important gap in the existing body of literature by examining the empirical evidence which other reviews have failed to focus on.

PROBLEM

The issue of tacking radicalization at its root causes in order to prevent recruitment to terrorism continues to be a priority for most democratic countries. However, there is little concrete information upon which states can design their policies and interventions and policies based on assumptions are unlikely to have the desired impact (Davis, 2014). Like every social process, both radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are complex and they need to be better understood both scientifically and academically. Whilst radicalization and recruitment are two inherently separate and distinct outcomes, they are also intrinsically connected. While radicalization of belief does not necessarily lead to radicalization of action (recruitment), radicalization of action is almost always preceded by radicalization of belief (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, 2017; Neumann, 2013). Recruitment to terrorism is therefore the end result of radicalization for some small portion of radicalized individuals. It is however true that radicalization is not a necessity for recruitment and indeed there have been many recruited individuals who were not overly radical or ideological. Nevertheless, while there has been some recent focus on such anomalies, the overwhelming majority of recruited individuals are radicalized (Horgan, 2012; Hafez & Mullins, 2015). As noted, radicalization, radicalism and actual terrorism are inherently distinct but simultaneously interrelated phenomena. Ultimately, very few radicals will go on to being recruited to carry
out acts of terrorism. But essentially all terrorists have been radicalized and in one way or another, recruited to commit their acts of violence (ICCT, 2016).

With respect to radical Islam for example, some estimates show a significant increase in the last 20 years of the number of individual Muslims holding radical views and/or sympathizing with jihadism. Rising from 5% 20 years ago to almost 30% today. This means that of the approximate 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide, approximately 3-500 million of them hold radical views. Following from these figures is the estimate that between 50-200,000 individuals have joined jihadist organizations. Tens of thousands more have gone through the training camps of Al-Qaeda and other organizations but never officially joined the organizations or carried out terrorism. There are also tens of thousands more individuals who provide different types of non-violent support to terrorists and terror organizations. It has therefore been argued that simply reducing popular support for radical ideology will not necessarily have an impact on terrorist recruitment (Gompert & Gordon, 2008, p.164; Clarke, 2004;).

Radicalization and recruitment to terrorism represent two sets of processes in which some will go on to commit acts of violence, whereas most will not. The question is then what are the risk factors of radicalization, and what additional factors, or lack of protective factors, separate or distinguish those who go on to be recruited from those who remain as non-violent radicals? It is generally accepted that individuals who become terrorists or join terrorist groups are driven by a combination of the three primary driving factors that have been identified; social, economic and psychological, and a fourth category of environmental factors. Rather than being motivated by deprivation, lack of political representation or poor mental health alone, radicalization and recruitment are the product of a multitude of factors that vary in their combination and prevalence, generally on a case by case basis. Additionally, radicalized individuals acting on behalf of different doctrines (Islam, right-wing, left-wing etc.) are also likely to demonstrate significant differences in the mix of factors that drive them to act. For example, right-wing extremists are generally poorly educated, whereas Islamic extremists are much more likely to be well educated. It has been noted that among violent offenders in general, there is great heterogeneity and we must avoid attempts to approach the issue with “one-size-fits-all” solutions (Widom, 2014).
In some of the recent attacks in Europe, Israel and elsewhere, the attackers’ psychological conditions have been blamed for their actions. While there exists a significant body of literature to review with respect to psychological factors, scholars have traditionally noted that there is little evidence of underlying psychosomatic or mental illness issues among terror recruits. In fact, it has been noted that the only psychological consistency found among terror recruits is overwhelming normality (Gill, 2012; Horgan, 2005; Kruglanski & Golec, 2004; Merari, 2004). Nevertheless, some claim that assumptions regarding psychological factors, or a lack thereof, were made too early and before enough evidence was available. Recent studies from Europe are finding that psychological factors may not be risk factors for radicalization (Bhui et-al, 2014) they may be risk factors for recruitment (Weenink, 2015).

The same issue exists with respect to both social and economic factors, which are generally regarded as playing more significant roles than psychological factors in both radicalization and recruitment. While some studies have found that poor economic conditions increase the likelihood of terrorism involvement, others have found this to not be the case. It is often pointed out that many terrorists come from middle and upper-middle class socio-economic settings, while still many others have come from even more upper-class environments. Additionally, such factors may be spatially and temporally dependent. For example, it is noted that the poorest countries and populations in the world, especially those in Africa, suffer little terrorism and produce few terrorists (Bloom, 2005; Clarke, & Newman, 2006; Gambetta, 2005; Hafez, 2006; Pape, 2005). However, in the Netherlands, those from lower socio-economic strata have been found to express the most radical beliefs (van Bergen et-al, 2015), while in Australia, radicalization was most likely to occur in either the upper class or the lower class, rather than in the middle class (Placeholder). Democratic countries have devoted significant attention and resources to economic development as part of their counter-terrorism strategies. However, there is significant doubt, based on empirical findings, that such development has any effect on terrorism (Berrebi, 2007; Reich, 2008). The GTI (2016) indicates that correlations with economic status differ significantly between democratic and non-democratic (and high-income and low-income countries) as well. Part of the purpose of this review is to explore the possibilities of providing some degree of reconciliation to these different findings.

The focus of policy that seeks to tackle terrorism at its root causes is enshrined by the Australian Attorney General, stating that “The best way to counter violent extremism is to prevent radicalisation emerging as an issue by addressing the societal drivers that can lead to
disengagement and isolation” (AG, 2010). But what are these ‘societal drivers’ that should be addressed? Again, it seems there is no consensus, with a slew of studies having produced vastly differing findings. It is true that social drivers are generally regarded as being the most significant factors in radicalization, perhaps because they represent such a broad, less specific set of factors. Different studies have pointed to intra and inter community relationships and characteristics, especially related to religion and politics, as well as institutions (such as education, health and governance) as being important aspects of the social factors that may affect radicalization and recruitment (Ganor, 2000; Abdul-Khalek, 2004; Zedalis, 2004; Hafez, 2007; Perry & Hasisi, 2015;). Another focus of counter-radicalization policies has been the improvement of education and educational opportunities, especially for susceptible minorities. However, this wisdom seems to be contradictory to some evidence that in high-income countries, higher education is more positively correlated with the likelihood of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism (Krueger, 2007; Krueger & Malickova, 2003; Bhui et-al, 2014). Some of the other putative risk factors may be more similar for radicalization and for recruitment. For example, previous criminality and imprisonment appears to be a risk factor for both radicalization and for recruitment (Jensen et-al, 2016; Bakker et-al, 2006; Bakker, 2009; German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, 2014; Bakker & De Bont, 2016).

Overall, the issue of radicalization and preventing recruitment by tackling the risk factors of radicalization, has become a priority for most democratic countries. However new challenges are constantly arising. For example, within the recent mass migrations into Europe are believed to be thousands of individuals who already hold what many would consider to be ‘radical' beliefs. Many of these already radicalized individuals are believed to have participated in jihadist training and/or activities. In this regard, some studies suggest that previous para-military training and experience is a strong risk factor for recruitment to terrorism. Beyond the threat that these individuals pose directly, there is also a fear that their presence could help to radicalize and even recruit others. To this end, foreign fighters from democratic countries have increasingly been involved in recruiting others from their home communities or countries. Among the thousands of European foreign fighters, approximately 30% are believed to have returned to Europe and are considered to represent a significant threat (ICCT, 2016).
The issue of recruitment today is much more difficult to label and examine than in the past. Mark Sageman (2004) argued that in the modern era recruitment is more “self-recruitment”, which is problematic to fight against since there are no specific recruiters to be apprehended. Sageman's observations have since been supported by a growing body of evidence that have found that rather than being ‘brainwashed’, many radicals actively seek out recruiters or ways to participate in or on behalf of terror organizations, primarily through the internet (Böckler et-al, 2015). Recruitment to terrorism therefore needs to be defined and approached in the broadest possible terms (Neumann & Brooke, 2007). Such an understanding is reflected in the EU's definition of recruitment as meaning “to solicit another person to commit or participate in the commission of a terrorist offence, or to join an association or group, for the purpose of contributing to the commission of one or more terrorist offences by the association or the group” (EU, 2005). They European Commissions has since elaborated that this means both “Recruitment to carry out terrorist offences” as well as actual “recruitment into a terrorist group” (EU, 2014). Therefore, it can be argued that anyone who is convinced by someone else to engage in an act of terrorism, even indirectly, and subsequently does so, has been recruited. This approach is in line with the distinction between radicalization of opinion and radicalization of action, where the latter refers to engagement in radical violent activities, the result of recruitment.

It follows that radicalization to action, recruitment, is one of the natural developmental outcomes or results of radicalization of belief that occurs in some small percentage of the radicalized population. Based on the discussion pertaining to the definitions and conceptions of radicalization and recruitment, this systematic review takes a broad approach to defining terrorism as being:

The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence against persons, as well as serious damage or threats to property, critical infrastructure or systems, carried out by non-state actor organizations, members or supporters of such organizations, small groups or individuals who are motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, and aim to instill fear in and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of the furtherance, advancement or promotion of goals that are usually political, social, religious or ideological.
This definition, whilst focussed on violent attacks and incorporating a broad approach to ideologies, allows for the inclusion of attacks against property when that property represents critical infrastructure or systems. This distinction is in line with the inclusion criteria for the Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2014). Additionally, whilst much of the discussion and literature on radicalization focusses on Islamic doctrine, like the approach of the EU (2004,2014,2015) this review takes a broad approach in examining all doctrines upon which radicalization and recruitment to terrorism may be based.

The purpose of this review is to identify and analyze the social, economic, psychological and environmental factors that lead to either radicalization and to recruitment to terrorism. Only by approaching the collective evidence in a systematic way and synthesizing the varied and often contradicting findings, can an understanding be reached which could provide the underpinnings for effective, evidence-based policies.

**POPULATION**

**Geography:** This review examines radicalization and recruitment of individuals in democratic and semi-democratic countries as defined by the Democracy Index (2016). As per the GTI (2016), there are significant differences in both the type of terrorism and their respective correlates between developed and developing countries. For example, socio-economic drivers have been found to be less prominent in countries that are suffering from existing internal conflict (GTI, 2015; 2016). This approach follows a number of other studies that have recognized the importance of separating high and low income countries in examinations of terrorism so as to avoid possible misinterpretations of data (Blomberg et-al, 2004a, 2004b; Sandler & Enders, 2006; GTI, 2016). There may also be methodological value in separating searches for such studies, with regards to the databases which should be searched and the synthesis of the data identified (Shenderovich et al, 2016).

**Demographics:** This review examines studies which examine radicalized individuals and/or already recruited individuals from across the ideological spectrum, including: religious, right-wing, left-wing, ethno-nationalist and single issue. This can include individuals or samples that include individuals who are categorized as 'radical' or 'radicalized' by the studies which examine them, as well as individuals or samples that include individuals who have been involved with or attempted to be involved with terrorist organization or activities.
This review examines radicalized individuals and recruited individuals who support, sympathize with or who have engaged in activities as a part of recognized organizations, or groups, small cells, pairs, or independently.

This review includes studies which examine radicalized and recruited individuals in line with the EU’s definitions as stated above.

All forms of ‘state terrorism’ are excluded from this study, with this being a separate and distinct topic.

The review will place no exclusions based on age, sex, race, religion and ethnicity.

**Types of radicalization:** The primary focus of the review focusses on radicalized individuals who meet the criteria of radicalization set by the studies which examine them and this can include:

- Those who support, sympathize or express an identification with terror groups or acts or who express radical beliefs, attitudes, opinions or willingness to engage in radical violence.

**Types of recruitment:**

- Those who actually carried out a terrorist attack or who were Foreign fighters (Those who joined a terrorist group overseas)

- Those who attempted to engage in violent activities but failed or were disrupted or who attempted to join a terrorist cell, group or organization but failed or were disrupted

- Those who engaged in non-violent terrorist activity such as; financing, material support, guidance, planning and recruitment.

By including these additional categories and types of radicalized and recruited individuals, the review approaches the issue with a broad description that includes both cognitive radicals and behavioural radicals (Neumann, 2013). Whilst this is a broad approach, it is important—albeit often lacking—to compare violent and non-violent terrorist offenders with each other (Frielich et al., 2015). This approach may enable the identification of those factors which differ for the two groups and what factors may be associated with the divergent pathways of radicalization of belief and radicalization of action.
OUTCOMES / RISK FACTORS

This review will focus on the identification and analysis of risks factors (and correlates?) of radicalisation in four main categories:

1) Social factor outcomes will also include but not be limited to individual characteristics and measurements such as those of marital status, family, criminal history (Raine, Brennan, Mednick & Mednick, 1996) and other factors, for example:
   i) Religion
   ii) Immigration
   iii) Politics, policing, legitimacy etc. (Doosje et-al, 2013; Schils & Pauwels, 2016).

2) Economic factors, for example:
   i) Real economic deprivation and poverty
   ii) Effects of low income and joblessness
   iii) Relative deprivation
   iv) Housing

3) Psychological factors, for example:
   i) Psychosomatic issues
   ii) Depression, anxiety
   iii) Other psychological conditions

4) Environmental factor outcomes will include but not be limited to measurements of macro and meso level factors, for example:
   i) Physical presence of local risk and protective institutions, such as ‘radical’ mosques (Precht, 2007)
   ii) Community level factors (e.g. government funded housing, high-crime area etc.)

Other outcomes which can be classified as hybrid factors, such as socio-economic or socio-psychological outcomes will also be included.

STUDY DESIGNS

The proposed review seeks to include as many examinations of economic, social and psychological risk factors of radicalization and recruitment to terrorism which provide empirical evidence. Studies which are purely descriptive, provide only descriptive statistics or correlations will be excluded. Since the literature is mostly absent of experimental studies, the review will therefore include only those studies which provide high quality correlation, risk factor and causal risk factor data. Priority is therefore attributed to the quality of the studies as follows:
1) Experimental studies, including social and environmental intervention studies which produce risk factors

2) All quasi-experimental studies where balanced comparison groups are present

3) Studies with statistical controls for identifying risk factors

4) High quality longitudinal and cross-sectional designs

We will subsequently examine separately and aggregately the primary categories noted above.

We will utilize a quality checklist as a quality assessment tool for inclusion of studies, based on their methodological quality; this has been recommended specifically for systematic reviews of risk factors, where it is not possible to use search strings which identify study designs. We plan to use either the Cambridge Quality Checklist or the STROBE tool (Murray, Farrington & Eisner, 2009).

We will search for studies in English but will include studies written in other languages where they are identified and warrant to be submitted for translation based on their English indexed abstracts (e.g. Bartos, 2011). It is not believed that English language search restrictions will lead to bias (Morrison et-al, 2012).

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<td>Cross-sectional</td>
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REFERENCES


Khalil, J. (2014). Radical beliefs and violent actions are not synonymous: How to place the key disjuncture between attitudes and behaviors at the heart of our research into political violence. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 37*(2), 198-211.

Khalil, J. (2014). Radical Beliefs and Violent Actions Are Not Synonymous: How to Place the Key Disjuncture Between Attitudes and Behaviors at the Heart of Our Research Into Political Violence. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 37*(2), 198-211.


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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

- Content: Badi Hasisi is the Director of the Institute of Criminology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is co-ordinator of the wider Terrorism study of which this review is a part of. Michael Wolfowicz is a PhD student with expertise in the field of terrorism research.

- Systematic review methods: David Weisburd: extensive experience in systematic review methods, and is a member of Campbell’s Crime & Justice group steering committee. Yael Litmanovitz was trained in systematic review methods at the University of Oxford’s Centre for Evidence-based Social Intervention, and recently published a protocol in the Campbell library

- Statistical analysis: David Weisburd, Badi Hasisi, Michael Wolfowicz

- Information retrieval: Michael Wolfowicz will manage the searches and information retrieval aspects of the review, together with research assistants who will receive training and support.
FUNDING

This review is being conducted as part of a European Commission funded project (agreement num. 699824).

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

This systematic review is being carried out as part of a task in a project being funded by the European Commission under the auspices of Horizon 2020. The project includes 20 partner institutions and examines radicalization and recruitment to Organized Crime and Terrorism, with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem leading the terrorism track.

There are three other systematic reviews being conducted by partners in the project on different topics.

PRELIMINARY TIMEFRAME

• Submission of draft protocol: 1 February 2017
• Submission of draft review: 1 November 2017
AUTHOR DECLARATION

Authors’ responsibilities

By completing this form, you accept responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and updating the review in accordance with Campbell Collaboration policy. The Coordinating Group will provide as much support as possible to assist with the preparation of the review.

A draft protocol must be submitted to the Coordinating Group within one year of title acceptance. If drafts are not submitted before the agreed deadlines, or if we are unable to contact you for an extended period, the Coordinating Group has the right to de-register the title or transfer the title to alternative authors. The Coordinating Group also has the right to de-register or transfer the title if it does not meet the standards of the Coordinating Group and/or the Campbell Collaboration.

You accept responsibility for maintaining the review in light of new evidence, comments and criticisms, and other developments, and updating the review every five years, when substantial new evidence becomes available, or, if requested, transferring responsibility for maintaining the review to others as agreed with the Coordinating Group.

Publication in the Campbell Library

The support of the Coordinating Group in preparing your review is conditional upon your agreement to publish the protocol, finished review, and subsequent updates in the Campbell Library. The Campbell Collaboration places no restrictions on publication of the findings of a Campbell systematic review in a more abbreviated form as a journal article either before or after the publication of the monograph version in Campbell Systematic Reviews. Some journals, however, have restrictions that preclude publication of findings that have been, or will be, reported elsewhere and authors considering publication in such a journal should be aware of possible conflict with publication of the monograph version in Campbell Systematic Reviews. Publication in a journal after publication or in press status in Campbell Systematic Reviews should acknowledge the Campbell version and include a citation to it. Note that systematic reviews published in Campbell Systematic Reviews and co-registered with the Cochrane Collaboration may have additional requirements or restrictions for co-publication. Review authors accept responsibility for meeting any co-publication requirements.

I understand the commitment required to undertake a Campbell review, and agree to publish in the Campbell Library. Signed on behalf of the authors:

Form completed by: Yael Litmanovitz

Date: 12 September 2016